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Abstract 
This study re-examines the validity of oil-hinders-democracy hypothesis by 
comparing the long-term effects of oil abundance and oil dependence 
democracies individually. Based on five novel measures of democracy from V-
DEM dataset, we test this hypothesis on data from 95 developing countries 
over the period 1932–2014. Our analyses show some nuances in the oil-
democracy relationship. First, that oil wealth adversely affects democracy 
across the full sample. Second, once we classified developing countries into 
five sub-samples, we consistently find that the influence of oil wealth 
(abundance/dependence) measures on democracy varies across geographical 
regions as well as small and large-scale oil endowment countries. Third, we find 
that institutional quality in the form of rule of law plays a crucial role in altering 
the oil–democracy link. Overall, we provide ample support for ‘Conditionalist 
view’. In other words, oil has different effects on democracy in the context of 
oil abundancy, geographic regions, and institutional aspects. More importantly, 
it seems that oil abundance does not hinder democracy in each of the five sub-
samples and in some instances can even be a blessing. Thus, it is worthy to 
make a distinction between these two types of oil wealth to better understand 
the oil-democracy relationship.   
Keywords 





Does natural-resource wealth foster or hinder democratic-institution outcomes? Notwithstanding 
decades of research, the question is still unresolved. A growing body of work in both economics and 
political science has pointed to the ‘natural-resource-curse’ thesis.1 The debate over the resource curse 
has focused on why resource-rich countries tend to grow at a slower rate and perform more poorly in 
their economic growth than resource-poor ones (Sachs and Warner 1995). 
In recent decades, the debate is focusing on the association between natural-resource wealth (and 
in particular, oil wealth) and political institutions (especially democratic institutions). For some time, 
a large number of political scientists have thought that oil wealth widely strengthens autocracy and 
inhibits democracy across a range of countries (Ahmadov 2014; Andersen and Aslaksen 2013; 
Anderson and Ross 2014; Aslaksen 2010; Cassidy 2019 ; Colgan 2010; Gassebner, Lamla, & Vreeland 
2013; Goldberg et al 2008; Jensen & Johnston 2011; Jensen and Wantchekon 2004; Murshed 2004; 
Ramsay 2011; Ross 2001, 2012, 2015;Smith 2017; Ulfelder 2007; Wantchekon 2002; Wigley 2018). 
However, other researchers have begun to question the validity of this conventional wisdom – largely 
on empirical grounds (Dunning 2008; Haber and Menaldo 2009, 2011; Herb 2005; Liou and Musgrave 
2014; O’Connor et al 2018; Oskarsson and Ottosen 2010). Some in the latter group find that oil wealth 
is good for democracy (Bruckner et al. 2012; Gurses  2009; Herb 2004; Liou and Musgrave 2014; 
Menaldo 2014; Wacziarg 2012), while others conclude that oil wealth has no effect on democracy 
(Haber and Menaldo 2009, 2012; O’Connor et al 2018). Still others find that the effect that oil wealth 
has on democracy is conditional on a host of factors (Brooks 2016; Caselli and Tesei 2016;  Dunning 
2008; Hendrix 2018;  Houle 2018; Jones Luong and Weinthal 2010; Lall 2017; Masi and  Ricciuti 2019) 
– for example, on inequality, temporal factors (before versus after a structural break in 1980, following 
the second-largest jump in oil prices – i.e. that of 1979), institutional strength, failures of authoritarian 
regimes and the structure of oil-industry ownership. 
In the current literature, baseline studies have shown apparently varying effects of oil wealth on 
democratic-institution outcomes. However, the literature also reveals a number of gaps and 
shortcomings in these studies that led to ambiguous results – for example, using one single measure 
of democracy (the majority of prior research has made use of the Polity index as a proxy for 
democratic institutions) or employing variables that poorly measure the concepts of democracy 
(Oskarsson and Ottosen 2010). Another shortcoming of the studies was even more glaring: their 
measurement of oil rents. The data used in most studies measured oil in terms of oil dependence, 
which caused endogeneity problems (Tsui 2011). The time-series estimation methods that were used 
may not have been the most appropriate for estimating the relationship between oil and democracy; 
more advanced time-series econometric methods were not used until very recently (O’Connor et al 
2018). Furthermore, the regression results were weakened by missing data – whether in the area of oil 
or democracy variables. Most of the existing literature has tended to focus on the short-term effects 
 
1 See, among others, Auty, 2001; Badeeb et al., 2017; Bhattacharyya et al., 2017; Doolot and Heathershaw, 2015; Frankel, 
2012; Murshed 2018; Porter and Watts, 2017; Ross, 2015; Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2016; Venables, 2016. 
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of oil resources on democracy rather than the long-term effects, which are more useful due to the 
typically slow speed of institutional change (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). The estimations of the 
impact of natural resources on democracy were based mainly at the cross-sectional level rather than 
being based on within-country variations (Aslaksen 2010). 
This study engages the aforementioned debate by testing the long-term effects of oil wealth on 
within-country democratic-institution outcomes. In particular, we examine the relationship between 
oil and democracy by using a newly released democracy-measuring dataset from the Varieties of 
Democracy project2 – comprising the categories of electoral, liberal, deliberative participatory and 
egalitarian democracy – and by adopting more sophisticated time-series estimation methods than 
hitherto. As far as we know, all previous studies have used either a single measure of democracy 
(Polity) or different aspects of democracy – such as political constraints, civil liberties and political 
rights – to examine the relationship between oil and democracy.  
Our paper contributes empirically to the scholarly debate over oil wealth and democracy in four 
ways:  
1) It investigates the validity of the ‘oil-hinders-democracy’ hypothesis by comparing the long-term 
effects of oil abundance – measured by oil and gas value per capita– and oil dependence – 
measured by oil and gas value as a share of GDP– on democracies individually. The 
aforementioned studies have focused on the effects of either oil abundance or oil dependence as 
oil wealth indicators on democracy, while there is almost no study which takes into account the 
effects of both indicators. By considering the growing literature on the resource curse hypothesis, 
there are few studies have used individually both of oil abundance and oil dependence as oil wealth 
indicators. Although, they have linked the extraction of natural resource to economic growth or 
violent civil conflict. For instance, on economic growth, Alexeev and Conrad (2009) and Shahbaz 
et al (2019) have examined the effects of both of resource abundance and resource dependence 
on economic growth. On violent civil conflict, Brunnschweiler et al (2009) and Basedau and Lay 
(2009) have used both of oil abundance and oil dependence as oil wealth indicators to explore the 
effect of oil wealth on violent conflict.  
2) To the best of our knowledge, it is one of very few studies that have employed a new approach in 
measuring democracy to determine the long-term relationship between oil wealth and democracy 
within countries over time. We use the data from V-DEM because it helps us in examining 
democratization with more reliable, valid, comprehensive and more nuanced measures than are 
commonly used. Most developing countries are neither fully democratic nor fully autocratic but 
something in the middle – referred to as ‘anocracies’. V-DEM captures nuances of democracy that 
go beyond the multi-party electoral process focus of the Polity data. 
3) Since the effects of oil on democracy may vary in different parts of the world, and for greater in-
depth understanding, this study splits its full sample into two classifications: (a) We have selected 
three regional groups, Middle East and North African (MENA), Latin America and the Caribbean 
(LAC) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA); and (b) We break the full sample into two groups according 
 
2 Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM) is an international research project which aims to develop new indicators of democracy 
in all countries all over the world from 1789 to the present. 
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to their oil endowments, countries with large oil endowments and those with smaller oil 
endowments, measured in terms of oil wealth per capita. A separate treatment for these different 
sub-samples is required because of significant differences in their historical circumstances, cultural 
background and socioeconomic status. 
4) Most importantly, we use a more advanced time-series econometric method, called panel VAR 
approach based on system GMM estimates, to capture the endogenous relationships between oil 
and democracy.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the relevant literature review; 
Section 3 covers samples, variables, data and modelling; Section 4 reports on and discusses the main 
empirical results; Section 5 provides robustness checks; and, finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 
6. 
2 Literature Review 
Since the end of the twentieth century, the relationship between resource wealth – especially oil wealth 
– and democratic institutions has received considerable attention. The existing literature on the effects 
of oil on democracy can be divided into three main branches. 
The first, large branch is consistent with the claim that ‘oil wealth impedes democracy and makes 
autocratic states more durable’. For instance, in his pathbreaking article ‘Does oil hinder democracy?’ 
(2001), by using pooled time-series cross-national data across 113 countries from 1971 to 1997, Ross 
finds strong evidence that oil wealth – measured by oil, gas and coal exports as a fraction of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) – hurts democracy and enables authoritarian governments to maintain their 
rule. He also was among the first to consider the causal relationship between oil wealth and democracy, 
and he suggested three causal mechanisms to explain the adverse effect of oil wealth on democracy:  
(a) The ‘rentier’ effect: oil-rich governments use low tax rates (taxation effect) and high spending 
(spending effect) to dampen democratic pressures;  
(b) The ‘repression’ effect: oil wealth enables governments to rule through strengthening their internal 
security forces;  
(c) The ‘modernization’ effect: when growth based on oil exports fails, circumstances drive citizens 
to focus on industrial and service-sector jobs and render them less likely to push for democracy.  
Hence, after Ross’ findings some studies have argued that ‘oil hinders democracy’. Ross himself re-
examined this hypothesis in his later study ‘Oil and democracy revisited’ (Ross 2009) by using a more 
exogenous variable of oil wealth that measured by oil income per capita – and he finds similar results. 
Ross’ main finding has been strengthened by a number of cross-country studies. Jensen and 
Wantchekon (2004) find a strong negative correlation between oil dependence and levels of democracy 
in 46 African states. Smith (2004) uses a different dependent variable by focusing on regime durability 
instead of the level of democracy. This study examines contrasting claims made by scholars of oil and 
politics that oil wealth either tends to undermine regime durability or to enhance it. Smith finds that 
oil wealth is robustly associated with increased regime stability. By using an event-history-analysis 
approach, Ulfelder (2007) confirms that autocratic governments are typically more durable in 
resource-rich countries. Tsui (2011) has used a unique dataset that exploits variation in the timing and 
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size of oil discoveries to identify the impact of oil wealth on democracy; his findings are also associated 
with discovery timing and size. He finds that discovering 100 billion barrels of oil significantly 
decreases a country’s prospects for democratic improvement for three decades. He also finds evidence 
indicating a greater negative impact of oil discovery in countries that experienced major finds early in 
their (post-independence) history than in those countries that did so later. However, Tsui offers new 
evidence for the long‐term negative effect of discovering oil wealth on democracy. More recently, 
Cassidy (2019) has examined the long-run effects of oil wealth on economic and political development 
outcomes by using information on geological basins to create an instrument for oil production across 
countries. Based on Instrumental variables estimation for 172 countries from 1966 to 2008. He 
demonstrates that oil production impedes democracy.  
The second branch of the literature (that of the ‘Conditionalist’) is associated with the claim that 
‘the effect of oil wealth on democracy is conditional on a host of factors’. Dunning (2008) suggests 
that natural resources may be associated with either authoritarianism or democracy, and conditioning 
variables influence whether the relationship between natural resources and democracy is positive or 
negative. He finds that a positive relationship between natural resources and democracy depends on 
the level of the private-income-inequality variable, based on a panel dataset that observes Latin 
America, the world’s most unequal region, since 1960. Luong and Weinthall (2010) follow in 
Dunning’s footsteps. They attempt to explain the different political outcomes that have been 
witnessed in five mineral-rich states of the former Soviet Union (Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), and they conclude that oil wealth only leads to hurtful political 
outcomes when the government has an overriding role in the structure of oil-industry ownership 
(public or private). Bhavnani and Lupu (2016) show evidence from a natural experiment in Brazil; they 
argue that the effect of natural-resource revenues on democracy is conditioned by the strength of 
institutions, and deduce that the greatest adverse effect of oil resources on democratic outcomes is 
seen when the municipalities of Brazil have weak institutions. Brooks and Kurtz (2016) also put forth 
a similar conclusion as Bhavnani and Lupu’s and re-examine the relationship between oil wealth and 
political regimes based on a panel of 183 countries. They find that oil wealth is not necessarily a curse 
and may even be a blessing with respect to democratic development. Using data on 118 autocratic 
countries between 1946 and 2004, Houle (2017) finds that the negative effect of oil on democracy is 
conditional on the failure of the authoritarian regime in question. In terms of economic-forms theory, 
Aytac et al. (2014) have offered a new explanation for the conditional effects of the resource curse by 
distinguishing between two kinds of economies: contract-intensive and clientelist economies. Using a 
two-step robust system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimations for 150 countries from 
1973 to 2000, their results indicate that the negative effect of natural-resource dependence on 
democracy is conditional on the prevailing economy type. Specifically, resource dependences are 
detrimental for democracy only in nations with clientelist economies while the resource curse is 
avoided in nations with contract-intensive economies. Caselli and Tsei (2016) find that resource-rent 
windfalls, which typically occur during commodity-price booms, encourage authoritarianism, as 
measured by the Polity scale, in countries that are already autocracies – prompting them to move 
towards greater levels of autocracy, and all the more so when the country displayed a relatively low 
initial degree of autocracy. Resource-rent windfalls have little impact on countries that are already 
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democracies in this connection. The findings are robust to a variety of techniques, including GMM 
techniques, as well as commodity classifications: more resources for dictators. But our hypothesis is 
that a resource windfall can be conditioned by rule of the law. 
The third branch of the literature is consistent with the claim that ‘oil wealth does not always 
impede democracy’. In other words, the second branch did not, in its view, find consistent support 
for the claim that ‘oil wealth impedes democracy’. Herb (2005) has examined the claim that oil impedes 
democracy, which was addressed by Ross (2001). He finds weak support for the notion that there is a 
net negative effect of oil wealth on democracy. In their important study, which has had a powerful 
impact on the ‘oil-hinders-democracy’ debate, Haber and Menaldo (2011) have questioned the 
conventional wisdom that oil fuels authoritarianism. Their study tests whether there is a long-term 
relationship between oil wealth and the level of democracy within countries over time. Using a unique 
historical dataset on resource wealth that covers up to 168 countries from 1800 to 2006 and applying 
time-series-centric methods that control for country-fixed effects and operationalize explicitly 
specified counterfactuals, they find that the association between oil wealth and authoritarianism 
disappears over the long run, and generate results that suggest a resource blessing. Using a similar 
approach, Liou and Musgrave (2015) apply a synthetic controls method in a small set of countries, 
and they find little evidence that a resource curse systematically prevents democratization. O’Connor 
et al. (2018) re-evaluate Haber and Menaldo’s findings by covering the latter’s shortcomings in their 
study; the results that they end up with lead back to Haber and Menaldo’s conclusion. By analysing 
the effect of oil on democracy in the context of colonization experiences, Omgba (2015) examines a 
large sample of oil-producing countries, and his main findings are that contemporaneous levels of 
democracy in oil countries are positively associated with the time elapsed between the beginning of 
oil production and a country’s political independence. In general, this branch casts doubt on the 
existence of a straightforward political resource curse.  
Consequently, the literature is inconclusive and, therefore, the present study aims to fill the 
research gap by testing the following research hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1. The effect of oil wealth on democratic institutions differs across geographic regions and 
oil endowment contexts.  
Hypothesis 2. The effect of oil wealth on democratic institutions can be conditioned by institutional 




3 Data and the Empirical Model 
3.1 Data 
Sample 
The study examines the relationship between two measures of oil wealth and five measures of 
democracy. The panel data for this study is strongly balanced and it includes 95 developing countries3 
for the 1932–2014 period.4 Table S. 1 in supplementary tables provides a list of countries in each 
group. Our dataset brings in data from a variety of different sources, including Ross and Mahdavi’s 
(2015) Oil and Gas dataset, V-DEM (2019), Haber and Menaldo (2011) American Political Science 
Review (APSR) Dataset and the Maddison Database (2018). 
Variables 
To explore the effects of oil abundance and oil dependence on democracy outcomes, we mainly 
employ the Oil and Gas dataset provided by Ross and Mahdavi (2015).5 This provides the best 
available information about the volume and value of oil and natural-gas production in all countries 
from 1932 to 2014. 
A. Endogenous independent variables: Data on oil wealth 
Before we choose the independent variable, we must discuss the measure of oil wealth that is supposed 
to explain the relationship between oil and democracy. Other empirical studies differ on this point. 
The most commonly used measure in empirical studies is resource dependence, which reflects the 
degree to which a country economically relies on resource rents within its overall economic activity 
(Haber and Menaldo 2011; Jensen and Wantchekon 2004; Ross 2001; Smith 2004; Ulfelder 2007; 
Wiens et al. 2014). Other studies use the measure of resource abundance, which reflects the national 
importance of a country’s resource rents (Al-Ubaydli 2012; Dunning 2008; Ramsay 2011; Ross 2012). 
However, we distinguish our study from much of previous empirical work by employing two measures 
of oil wealth (oil abundance and oil dependence) rather than one. This will give us a unique insight 
into the conditions under which natural resources may block or encourage democracy. 
To capture oil abundance, we used the quantity of extracted oil and gas multiplied by the per-unit 
world price and then divided by population size (oil and gas value per capita). For oil dependence, we 
used the quantity of oil and gas extracted in a given year multiplied by the per-unit world price divided 
by GDP (the share of oil and gas value in GDP). The data on oil and gas value is obtained from the 
dataset of Ross and Mahdavi (2015), who obtained data from the US Geological Survey, the US 
Energy Information Administration, the World Bank and the BP Statistical Review. This dataset 
 
3 We are particularly interested in the fate of developing countries, because most of developed countries like Norway and 
the United States have achieved the threshold level in democracy many years ago, while the developing countries they still 
struggling to reach the upper limit of democracy. 
4 Our choice of the period (1932-2014) is limited by the availability of the data on oil wealth from Ross & Mahdavi 2015 
dataset. 
5  https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/ZTPW0Y (Ross & Mahdavi, 2015). 
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covers all countries from 1932 to 2014. Additionally, and as an alternative measure to oil wealth, we 
also employ the concept of oil income.6 
Due to the highly skewed nature of the data on resource rents and to the presence of zero values 
in the ‘log’ transformation of oil wealth, we enter our regressions in the form of natural log of (1+oil 
wealth). 
B. Dependent variables: Data on democracy 
Researchers typically use the Polity index as a proxy for democratic institutions (Alexeev and Conrad 
2009;  Anyanwu et al. 2013; Aslaksen 2010;  Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010; Dunning 2008; 
Haber and Menaldo 2011; Jensen and Wantchekon 2004; Murshed 2004; Ramsay 2011; Ross 2001; 
Smith 2004; Herb 2005; Tsui 2010; Ulfelder 2007), which has several shortcomings as a measurement 
of democracy in terms of political rights and liberties – as identified by Oskarsson and Ottosen (2010). 
One of these is that Polity does not consider to what extent the citizenry enjoys civil liberties and 
political rights, focusing mainly on the nature of multi-party electoral processes. Fortunately, since 
2010, more than 50 scholars have responded with a global collaborative effort, known as the Varieties 
of Democracy (V-DEM) dataset, to stringently document the features of democracy for 201 countries 
from 1789 to 2017. To test our hypothesis, we draw our dependent variables from this unique database 
(V-DEM, Version 9). In this study we used five main indicators of democracy that offer distinctive 
approaches to defining democracy (Coppedge et al. 2016): Electoral, Liberal, Deliberative, 
Participatory and Egalitarian democracy. It is important to note that each democracy index is based 
on various subcomponents. Supplementary  Table S. 2  summarizes the definitions of the five-
outcome variables as defined by V-DEM. All of these democracy measures are reported in such a way 
that assigns values between 0 and 1. Larger values indicate a better quality of democracy. V-DEM data 
shows much greater variation and has the advantage of a variety of sub-components which are fine 
grained to capture more aspects of democracy. In particular, it separates a liberal component index 
from the electoral democracy index. While elections are common in most developing countries respect 
for liberal values are less common. The V-DEM electoral democracy index plays close attention to 
aspects of electoral fairness and freedom of expression. The separate liberal component index and is 
concerned with judicial and legislative constraints on the executive, as well as respect for human rights 
and equality before the law. Since Liberal component index is formed by averaging the following three 
indices: equality before the law and individual liberties (v2xcl_rol), judicial constraints on the executive 
(v2x_jucon), and legislative constraints on the executive (v2xlg_legcon). We have used legislative 
constraints on the executive index to capture liberal democracy, which excludes the rule of law to 
avoid multicollinearity as we use it as a control for the quality of institution. In addition, V-DEM also 
provides us with the participatory component index, which is a measure of civil society engagement 
and the role of sub-national government. The deliberative component index records the extent of 
policy dialogue and discourse underpinning government policy formation. 
  
 
6 The data source for this variable is taken from the data set constructed by Haber and Menaldo (2011). 
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C. Control variables 
Oil wealth is, naturally enough, not the only variable affecting democracy. In order to avoid any 
potential omitted variable bias, we control for several other variables that have been defined in the 
literature on political science, which has been strongly associated with democratic institution 
outcomes: 
1. Income per capita (Maddison Database 2018)  
2. GDP growth (Maddison Database 2018) 
3. Trade Openness: represents international economic Integration, measured as exports plus 
imports as a share of GDP (V-DEM 2019; Maddison Database 2018).  
These first three explanatory variables are likely to be endogenous to democracy (Acemoglu et al 2008; 
Fortunato and Panizza 2015; Murshed 2018). Thus, we have treated them as an endogenous 
independent variable to democracy.  
4. The log of population7 (Maddison Database 2018); 
5. Institutional quality: Following to Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) and Alexeev and 
Conrad (2009), we mainly use the rule of law to proxy institutional quality as it is an important 
break on the abuse of power. 
6. A series of dummy variables for regions to mark countries in Latin America, the Middle East 
and Sub-Saharan Africa as the reference category and for small and large per-capita oil 
endowments. 
Supplementary Table S. 3 describes all the variables used in our empirical analysis. 
3.2 The empirical model 
We now investigate the long-term effects of oil abundance and oil dependence on within-country 
democratic institutions outcomes. We regress the five democracy measures on the two indicators of 
oil wealth and a series of other covariates over the period 1932–2014 by using the System-GMM panel 
VAR model in the global sample of 98 countries, which was originally proposed by Holtz-Eakin et al. 
(1988) based the traditional VAR model by Sims (1980). Specifically, we estimate the following two 
models:  
ΔDit = 𝐴1 ΔDi,t−1 + 𝐴2Δ (Oil Abundance)i,t−1 +  𝐴3Δ (GDP pc)i,t−1 + 𝐴4Δ (GDP growth)i,t−1 
+𝐴5Δ (Openness)i,t−1 + B Δ X𝑖,𝑡−1+δi+ω𝑡 + μi,t                               (𝐼) 
ΔDit = 𝐵1 ΔDi,t−1 + 𝐵2 Δ (Oil Dependence)i,t−1 + 𝐵3Δ (GDP pc)i,t−1 + 𝐵4Δ (GDP growth)i,t−1 
+𝐵5Δ (Openness)i,t−1 + P Δ X𝑖,𝑡−1+γi + ∂𝑡 + εi,t                              (𝐼𝐼) 
Where Di,t denotes a vector of the dependent stationary series – namely, democracy (Electoral, Liberal, 
Deliberative Participatory or Egalitarian) for country i at year t. The main variable of interest in Model 
I is oil abundance (the log of oil value per capita) and in Model II is Oil Dependence (the log of oil 
value as % of GDP). A2 in Model I therefore captures the effect of oil abundance on each democracy 
 
7 Haber and Menaldo 2011. 
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measure and B2 in Model II therefore captures the effect of oil dependence on each democracy 
measure. Xi,t is a vector of the other variables. The vector of time-varying country characteristics Xi,t 
includes the rule of law and Population. δi and γi denote country-fixed effects that capture 
unobservable time-invariant country characteristics. ω𝑡 and ∂𝑡 are time-fixed effects that capture 
common shocks to democracy for all countries. The error terms μit and εit capture all other omitted 
factors and are clustered at the country level –hence, they may be arbitrarily serially correlated within 
countries. 
We test Models I and II both on the full sample and on a subsample. The size of subsample differs, 
depending on the level of oil endowment and the nature of the region. For per-capita oil endowment, 
the subsample includes 30 small oil endowment countries (compared with the full sample of 95) and 
32 large oil endowment countries. For the regional groups, the sub-sample includes 14 Middle East 
and North African, 22 Latin American and 42 Sub-Saharan African countries. Splitting the sample 
into these country groups helps us to identify the effect of oil abundance and oil dependence on 
democracy  
4 Empirical Results 
4.1 General summary statistics 
Table A.1 in Appendix A shows the summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis and for 
the full sample, and for each group individually. Column 1 reports the mean and standard deviation 
for the whole sample. In the next two Columns, the full sample is classified into two groups according 
to the scale of oil endowment (as measured by oil and gas value per capita). In the last three Columns, 
countries are classified into the three aforementioned regional groups. Panel A of Table A.1 presents 
the key independent variables: oil value per capita and oil value as share of GDP. Panel B provides 
descriptive statistics for the five dependent variables of democracy. Panel C shows the other variables. 
Panel A indicates that MENA countries are characterized by a greater oil abundance - oil value per 
capita- and oil dependence - Oil Value as % of GDP- than those of other regions. MENA countries 
tended to be richer and depend largely on oil than LAC and SSA countries. Also, it shows that SSA 
countries have the lowest oil value per capita. While LAC countries have the lowest oil and gas value 
as share of GDP from 1932 to 2014. Panel B shows that the average of five democracy variables in 
1932 significantly above average of five democracy variables in 2014, reflecting a general tendency 
towards toward democratic institutions. Remarkably, Panel B demonstrates that small-scale oil 
endowment countries are associated with a higher mean score in all the democracy indices than are 
the large-scale oil endowed countries. Also, it shows that the LAC countries have achieved the highest 
mean score in all the democracy indices. Interestingly, in Panel C the LAC countries also have the 
greatest mean score in rule of law among the other regions.  
Table 1 summarises separately each of the five democratic-institution measures and the other 
control variables according to whether a country has produced any oil from 1950 to 2014. In the full 
sample of 98 countries, 68 countries have produced oil and 43 had zero oil production. In 1950 average 
electoral democracy in non-oil countries was 0.8 percentage points higher than average democracy in 
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oil countries. By 2014 this difference had declined to 0.34 percentage points, though neither difference 
is statistically significant (p1950 = 0.7838, p2014=0.9367). While the average of electoral democracy over 
the period 1950-2014 was greater in non-oil countries than oil countries (p1950-2014= 0.000). Liberal, 
participatory, deliberative and egalitarian democracy were similar in the two groups from 1950 to 2014.  
However, oil countries had greater Per capita income from 1950 to 2014 compared to non-oil 
countries (p1950-2014= 0.000). Average trade is almost indistinguishable in the two groups. Moreover, 
average rule of law which we used as a proxy to institutional quality, was slightly stronger in non-oil 
countries than non-oil countries, from 1950 to 2014. 
Table 1 







Obs. of Oil 
Countries 
Obs. of Non- 
Oil Countries 
Obs. 
Panel A. Democracy measures 
Electoral democracy in 1950 0.165 0.170 -0.005 0.876 62 43 105 
Electoral democracy in 2014 0.478 0.501 -0.023 0.585 65 43 108 
Electoral democracy 1950-2014 0.304 0.323 -0.019*** 0.001 4172 2795 6967 
Liberal democracy in 1950 0.318 0.265 0.053 0.255 62 43 105 
Liberal democracy in 2014 0.544 0.550 -0.006 0.910 65 43 108 
Liberal democracy 1950-2014 0.375 0.390 -0.015** 0.030 4172 2795 6967 
Participatory democracy in 1950 0.081 0.089 -0.008 0.645 62 43 105 
Participatory democracy in 2014 0.298 0.307 -0.008 0.794 65 43 108 
Participatory democracy 1950-2014 0.173 0.183 -0.009** 0.015 4171 2795 6966 
Deliberative democracy in 1950 0.104 0.104 0.000 0.985 62 43 105 
Deliberative democracy in 2014 0.370 0.376 -0.006 0.886 65 43 108 
Deliberative democracy 1950-2014 0.216 0.227 -0.011** 0.032 4172 2795 6967 
Egalitarian democracy in 1950 0.112 0.099 0.012 0.521 62 43 105 
Egalitarian democracy in 2014 0.332 0.331 0.000 0.993 65 43 108 
Egalitarian democracy 1950-2014 0.220 0.218 0.002 0.588 4172 2795 6967 
Panel B. Other control variables 
GDP per capita (ln) 8.282 7.688 0.595 0.000 3977 2470 6447 
Trade 6.287 4.707 1.581 0.000 3556 1911 5467 
Population (ln) 16.023 15.060 0.963 0.000 4215 2795 7010 
Rule of law 0.421 0.438 -0.018 0.003 4192 2795 6987 
Number of countries 68 43      
Notes: *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate how the trends of the five democratic-institutions measures and the two 
indicators of oil wealth (oil value per capita and oil value as share of GDP) have developed over the 
1932–2014 period across the full sample of 98 countries and in each of the country groups. It appears 
that oil value per capita began to decrease gradually from the 1980s until the mid- to late 1990s, when 




Oil Abundance (Oil value per capita) & the five Democratic Institutions measures.  
Smoothed trends (1932 – 2014) 
 







































































































































































Source: Authors' construction using data from V-Dem (2018) and Ross (2014) 
While it starts decrease gradually in LAC and SSA in mid-1980s. Similarly, oil value as share of GDP 




Oil Dependence & the five Democratic Institutions measures.  
Smoothed trends (1932 – 2014) 
 











































































































































































Source: Authors' construction using data from V-Dem (2019) and Ross (2014). 
The increase in oil wealth post-1980 was due to the associated dramatic increases in oil prices. The 
period following this first, and greatest, oil shock gave a boost to the nationalization of oil, when oil-
exporting countries nationalized the assets of foreign-owned oil companies and began managing it 
through new national companies. Moreover, adoption of the five democracy measures has generally 
increased over time in all the country groups – with a noticeable uptick from the 1990s onwards.  
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In addition, Electoral Democracy shows the greatest improvement compared with the remaining 
four democracy measures, while Participatory Democracy has the lowest level in most sup-sample 
groups. Overall, the five democracy indices generally exhibit the same tendency, but in SSA, there are 
differences between the democratic measures: electoral democracy keep increasing after the mid-
1990s, while the rest of democracy variables declined in the mid-1990s. This demonstrates why we 
should consider multiple measures of democratic institutions rather than just relying on one. The claim 
that oil wealth associates negatively with democratic-institution outcomes can be clearly seen between 
oil abundance and oil dependence and the five democracy measures in large-scale oil endowed  and 
MENA countries after the 1980s. In order to investigate the effect of oil wealth on democratic 
institutions, further analysis is warranted. 
 
4.2 Results for Stationarity Test, Panel Cointegration Test and Panel VAR lag selection 
Cross-sectional unit root test 
As a first step, before estimating the panel VAR model, we examine the stationary properties of the 
variables by using Dickey Fuller, Fisher type panel tests (Choi, 2001), where the null hypothesis is that 
all panels (countries) contain a unit root. The empirical results of Dickey Fuller, Fisher type panel unit 
root tests are reported in supplementary Table S.4. The test shows that the null hypothesis of unit 
root process is accepted for all the variables at the level with intercept and trend for the majority of 
variables. This means that that all variables are stationary not in levels but in first differences, which 
is a vital condition for estimating a PVAR model. 
The Westerlund panel cointegration test 
The unit root analysis reveals that most series under study are integrated with first order I (1). The 
next step is to examine the long-term relationship between all the variables. In doing so, we employed 
the Westerlund (2007) panel cointegration tests, which account for cross-sectional dependence among 
countries in order to test the null hypothesis of cointegration against the alternative of absence of 
cointegration. The results of the Westerlund (2007) tests are reported in Supplementary Tables (S.5.1- 
S.5.4). Which show that the null hypothesis of no cointegration is not be rejected either for the full 
sample or for each of the five subsamples. Therefore, the best way in which to examine the existence 
of the long-term relationship between all the variables is to estimate Model I and II scenarios for all 
the variables in first differences by employing the System-GMM panel VAR approach.  
Panel VAR lag selection 
Before we estimate our models, it is important to select the correct lag length for panel VAR. We 
adopt the first-order panel VAR model based on the smallest likelihood criteria of modified Akaike 
information criteria (MAIC), Modified Bayesian information criteria (MBIC) and modified Hannan-




4.3 System-GMM panel VAR estimation results 
Effect of oil wealth on democracy in full sample 
We now begin our empirical investigation of the democratic effects of oil abundance and oil 
dependence. Table (2-4) present the main system-GMM panel VAR results. In each table, we 
categorized the analysis per type of oil wealth (abundance/dependence) measure to compare their 
effects on each of the five democratic-institution measures. Columns (1–5) present the results of the 
long-run effects of oil abundance (Model I), while Columns (6–10) summarizes the results of the long-
run effects of oil dependence (Model II). In both models, we employed the dynamic System-GMM 
panel VAR approach. 
Table 2 presents the long-run effects of oil abundance and oil dependence on each of the five 
democratic-institution measures in full sample by using the dynamic System-GMM panel VAR 
approach. The results presented in the first five Columns provide strong evidence that oil abundance 
hampers democracy over time for the full sample. According to PVAR estimates shown in Column 
(1) of Table 2, a 1 % increase in oil value per capita reduces the level of electoral democracy by 0.379%. 
In Columns 2-5, the same increase in oil value per capita reduces the level of liberal democracy by 
0.128%, deliberative democracy by 0.281%, participatory democracy by 0.393% and egalitarian 
democracy by 0.430%.  
Table 2 
The effect of oil wealth on each of the five democratic-institution measures in full Sample:  
Oil Abundance vs Oil Dependence (1932–2014). System-GMM panel VAR. 
 Oil Abundance (Oil Value per capita) and Democracy  Oil Dependence (Oil Value as % of GDP) and Democracy 
Dependent Variables 
Δ Electoral  
Dem 
Δ Liberal  
Dem 
Δ Delib  
Dem 
Δ Partic  
Dem 
Δ Egalita  
Dem 
 
Δ Electoral  
Dem 
Δ Liberal  
Dem 
Δ Delib  
Dem 
Δ Partic  
Dem 
Δ Egalita  
Dem 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Δ Oil Abundance (t-1) -0.379*** -0.128*** -0.281*** -0.393*** -0.430***       
 [0.013] [0.019] [0.010] [0.007] [0.008]       
Δ Oil Dependence (t-1)       -0.071*** -0.315*** 0.011 -0.084*** -0.167*** 
       [0.007] [0.020] [0.010] [0.002] [0.005] 
Δ GDP per capita (t-1) 0.081 0.159** 0.044 -0.005 0.080  -0.211*** -0.207*** -0.092 -0.026 0.004 
 [0.043] [0.100] [0.030] [0.028] [0.023]  [0.044] [0.065] [0.047] [0.024] [0.019] 
Δ GDP growth (t-1) -0.028 -0.018 -0.027* -0.025** -0.043**  -0.027** -0.018 -0.033*** -0.018*** -0.012 
 [0.010] [0.013] [0.005] [0.003] [0.004]  [0.005] [0.020] [0.004] [0.002] [0.002] 
Δ Openness (t-1) -0.062 -0.130** -0.092 -0.164** -0.126**  -0.004 -0.202*** -0.027 -0.068* -0.058 
 [0.014] [0.032] [0.010] [0.008] [0.007]  [0.008] [0.022] [0.008] [0.005] [0.005] 
Δ (ln) Population (t-1) 0.066 0.004 0.062** 0.026 0.087***  -0.071*** -0.040** 0.030 0.013 0.058*** 
 [0.284] [0.081] [0.043] [0.022] [0.028]  [0.049] [0.097] [0.032] [0.021] [0.021] 
Δ Rule of law (ln) 0.484*** -0.012 0.528*** 0.374*** 0.555***  0.426*** 0.000 0.478*** 0.265*** 0.423*** 
 [0.037] [0.048] [0.037] [0.039] [0.052]  [0.024] [0.036] [0.027] [0.034] [0.022] 
Hansen J: P-value 0.232 0.268 0.200 0.378 0.113  0.187 0.430 0.424 0.328 0.311 
Observations 4582 4582 4582 4582 4582  4519 4519 4519 4519 4519 
Countries  95 95 95 95 95  95 95 95 95 95 
Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. All regressions were carried out using dynamic System-GMM panel 
VAR methodology (pvar command on stata). Hansen overidentification p values greater than 0.05 for all the specifications, this imply that we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis which states that instruments used are valid. 
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The effects are statistically significant at 1 % levels. On the other hand, this trend is shared with oil 
dependence as well (Columns 6-10), but with one exception – the electoral democracy was 
insignificant, even though, the sign remains negative. To obtain a negative relationship between oil 
wealth and democracy across a range of countries is not surprising because as discussed above the 
related literature on political resource curse thesis provide necessary arguments for this curse. For 
now, at least, we conclude that oil abundance and oil dependence impede democracy in the full sample. 
This result is consistent with Anderson and Ross (2014), Cassidy (2019), Fails (2019), Hendrix (2018), 
Ross (2001) and Wigley (2018). 
Conditional effect of oil wealth on democracy: Oil abundancy context 
To test whether the effect of oil on democracy may varies across oil-producing countries, we re-sample 
our data by calculating a threshold value for oil wealth. Following to Cotet and Tsui (2013), we 
calculate the median of average oil value per capita over the full sample period 1932–2014 (i.e. the log 
of oil value per capita is 3.84 million barrels per capita), and then we define the 3.84 value as the 
threshold level to determine whether an oil country has large or small oil endowment. Thus, we divide 
our sample into two groups: small-scale oil endowment and large- scale oil endowment countries based 
on the 3.84 value as threshold level. More precisely, a dummy variable takes a value of one if the 
country produces more than 3.84 million barrels per capita, and it takes a value of zero, otherwise. 
Table 3 reports system dynamic panel data estimates for the two measures of oil wealth. Panel A 
presents PVAR results for small-scale of oil endowment countries, while Panel B for Large-scale of 
oil endowment countries. On the one hand, in small-scale oil countries (Panel A, Column 1-5), oil 
abundance does not have any significant effect on five democracy measures except deliberative 
democracy. Unlike small-scale oil countries, oil abundance does have a positive and significant effect 
on electoral democracy for large-scale oil countries (Panel B, Column 1) while it does not have any 
significant effect on the rest democracy measures. These results suggest that oil abundance promotes 
electoral democracy in large-scale oil countries. This result is similar to those obtained by Bruckner et 
al. 2012, Gurses 2009, Herb 2004, Liou and Musgrave 2014, Menaldo 2016 and Wacziarg 2012 who 
found a convincing evidence that oil wealth is good for democracy. For the other measure of oil wealth 
(oil dependence), there exist no long-run relationship between oil dependence and the five measures 
of democracy (Panel A, Column 6-10). On the other hand, estimates from Table 3 display that oil 
abundance and oil dependence have no effects on electoral, liberal, deliberative, participatory or 
egalitarian democracy during the period 1932–2014 for small-scale oil countries (Panel A, Column 1-
10). This empirical finding supports the view put forward by Haber and Menaldo (2011), who suggest 
that natural resources and democracy are unrelated. Moreover, after confirming that oil wealth 
adversely affecting democracy across developing countries, it seems that our results from Table 3 
clearly indicate that the negative effect has vanished once we classified developing countries into small 
and large oil endowment countries. we consistently find a positive relationship between “oil 
abundance” and two measures of democracy namely electoral and liberal democracy in large oil 
endowment countries, whilst there is no long run relationship in small oil endowment countries. Thus, 
oil’s effect on democracy depends on whether an oil country has large or small oil endowment. 
Furthermore, the estimation results also clearly imply that the effect of oil on democracy in large-scale 
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oil countries has differed depends on two types of oil wealth. Thus, it is worthy to make a distinction 
between these two types of oil wealth to better understand the oil-democracy relationship. 
Table 3 
The effect of oil wealth on each of the five democratic-institution measures in small and large oil countries: 
Oil Abundance vs Oil Dependence (1932–2014). System-GMM panel VAR. 
  Oil Abundance (Oil Value per capita) and Democracy  Oil Dependence (Oil Value As % of GDP) and Democracy 
Dependent Variables 
Δ Electoral  
Dem 
Δ Liberal  
Dem 
Δ Delib  
Dem 
Δ Partic  
Dem 
Δ Egalita  
Dem 
 
Δ Electoral  
Dem 
Δ Liberal  
Dem 
Δ Delib  
Dem 
Δ Partic  
Dem 
Δ Egalita  
Dem 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Panel A: Small-scale Oil Endowment (32 countries) 
Δ Oil Abundance (t-1) -0.249 -0.055 -0.309* -0.112 -0.287       
 [0.022] [0.086] [0.018] [0.012] [0.014]       
Δ Oil Dependence (t-1)       -0.105 -0.121 0.059 0.044 -0.150 
       [0.020] [0.081] [0.016] [0.013] [0.015] 
Δ GDP per capita (t-1) 0.168 0.017 0.237** 0.128 0.102  -0.037 -0.044 0.173* 0.156 0.005 
 [0.096] [0.377] [0.073] [0.049] [0.055]  [0.086] [0.308] [0.064] [0.049] [0.048] 
Δ GDP growth (t-1) -0.062* -0.136** -0.069* 0.001 -0.064*  -0.061* -0.122** -0.060* -0.032 -0.063* 
 [0.021] [0.084] [0.018] [0.015] [0.012]  [0.020] [0.080] [0.016] [0.013] [0.012] 
Δ Openness (t-1) 0.035 -0.262*** 0.027 -0.112 0.049  0.098 -0.194* 0.063 0.009 0.082 
 [0.012] [0.042] [0.009] [0.008] [0.007]  [0.015] [0.045] [0.011] [0.007] [0.009] 
Δ (ln) Population (t-1) 0.142** -0.047 0.044 0.066 0.096*  0.074 -0.039 0.063 0.025 0.067 
 [0.181] [0.419] [0.132] [0.107] [0.102]  [0.175] [0.420] [0.132] [0.090] [0.092] 
Δ Rule of law (t-1) 0.283*** -0.056 0.301*** 0.106 0.262***  0.253*** -0.061 0.296*** 0.095 0.256*** 
 [0.102] [0.154] [0.085] [0.059] [0.066]  [0.104] [0.156] [0.084] [0.064] [0.060] 
Hansen J: P-value 0.085 0.378 0.282 0.352 0.247  0.037 0.186 0.141 0.127 0.061 
Observations 1548 1548 1548 1548 1548  1521 1521 1521 1521 1521 
Panel B: Large-scale Oil Endowment (30 countries) 
Δ Oil Abundance (t-1) 0.330** 0.035 0.147 0.019 0.105       
 [0.018] [0.049] [0.014] [0.008] [0.008]       
Δ Oil Dependence (t-1)       -0.002 0.021 -0.031 -0.196* -0.022 
       [0.022] [0.082] [0.020] [0.017] [0.012] 
Δ GDP per capita (t-1) 0.182 -0.020 0.189 0.130 0.160  0.242** -0.020 0.233** 0.278** 0.357*** 
 [0.055] [0.149] [0.050] [0.030] [0.028]  [0.056] [0.168] [0.045] [0.038] [0.034] 
Δ GDP growth (t-1) 0.028 0.012 0.046 0.011 0.049  0.015 0.053 0.031 -0.010 0.017 
 [0.016] [0.034] [0.012] [0.009] [0.008]  [0.014] [0.035] [0.011] [0.010] [0.008] 
Δ Openness (t-1) -0.213 0.002 -0.120 -0.012 -0.077  -0.036 0.228 -0.019 -0.045 -0.131 
 [0.043] [0.124] [0.035] [0.019] [0.020]  [0.033] [0.120] [0.029] [0.023] [0.021] 
Δ (ln) Population (t-1) -0.096 -0.143** -0.151** -0.088* -0.087  0.007 -0.060 -0.085 -0.013 -0.036 
 [0.141] [0.453] [0.135] [0.078] [0.077]  [0.119] [0.420] [0.118] [0.076] [0.074] 
Δ Rule of law (t-1) 0.411*** 0.054** 0.464*** 0.220** 0.388***  0.354*** 0.038 0.382*** 0.259** 0.386*** 
 [0.094] [0.078] [0.096] [0.070] [0.055]  [0.087] [0.091] [0.080] [0.078] [0.051] 
Hansen J: P-value 0.138 0.067 0.336 0.083 0.065  0.886 0.716 0.971 0.974 0.897 
Observations 1560 1560 1560 1560 1560  1524 1524 1524 1524 1524 
Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. All regressions were carried out using dynamic System-GMM panel 
VAR methodology (pvar command on stata). Hansen overidentification p values greater than 0.05 for almost all of the specifications, this imply that we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis which states that instruments used are valid. 
Conditional effect of oil wealth on democracy: Geographic regions context 
To investigate whether geographic areas is important in understanding the oil–democracy relationship, 
we break the full sample into three regional groups, Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Latin 
America and the Caribbean (LAC), and Sub-Saharan Africa  (SSA).  
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Table 4   The effect of oil wealth on each of the five democratic-institution measures in different regions 
(LAC MENA & SSA countries): Oil Abundance vs Oil Dependence (1932–2014). System-GMM panel VAR. 
 Oil Abundance (Oil Value per capita) and Democracy  Oil Dependence (Oil Value as % of GDP) and Democracy 
Dependent Variables 
Δ Electoral  
Dem 
Δ Liberal  
Dem 
Δ Delib  
Dem 
Δ Partic  
Dem 
Δ Egalita  
Dem 
 
Δ Electoral  
Dem 
Δ Liberal  
Dem 
Δ Delib  
Dem 
Δ Partic  
Dem 
Δ Egalita  
Dem 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Panel A. Latin America and Caribbean (22 countries) 
Δ Oil Abundance (t-1) 0.065 -0.367 0.029 -0.164 -0.025       
 (0.044) (0.162) (0.039) (0.027) (0.022)       
Δ Oil Dependence (t-1)       -0.047 -0.276 -0.100 -0.220** -0.001 
       (0.056) (0.385) (0.057) (0.049) (0.037) 
Δ GDP per capita (t-1) 0.082 -0.327 -0.088 -0.091 -0.094  -0.041 -0.765*** -0.009 -0.169 -0.197 
 (0.202) (0.612) (0.196) (0.131) (0.106)  (0.178) (0.707) (0.154) (0.117) (0.103) 
Δ GDP growth (t-1) 0.061 -0.053 -0.019 -0.019 -0.026  0.057 -0.161 0.032 -0.018 -0.015 
 (0.057) (0.162) (0.051) (0.027) (0.027)  (0.046) (0.201) (0.038) (0.026) (0.024) 
Δ Openness (t-1) 0.036 -0.175* -0.010 0.048 -0.004  0.057 -0.259* -0.011 0.046 0.009 
 (0.019) (0.057) (0.015) (0.012) (0.008)  (0.020) (0.097) (0.013) (0.012) (0.009) 
Δ (ln) Population (t-1) 0.003 0.037 0.003 0.029 0.055  -0.017 0.034 -0.012 0.017 0.039 
 (0.099) (0.289) (0.096) (0.079) (0.062)  (0.107) (0.347) (0.090) (0.078) (0.063) 
Δ Rule of law (t-1) 0.287** 0.052 0.505*** 0.204* 0.244**  0.468*** 0.111*** 0.488*** 0.228** 0.415*** 
 (0.164) (0.089) (0.156) (0.086) (0.071)  (0.171) (0.109) (0.143) (0.084) (0.092) 
Hansen J: P-value 0.270 0.183 0.660 0.897 0.285  0.230 0.236 0.256 0.791 0.261 
Observations 1265 1265 1265 1265 1265  1253 1253 1253 1253 1253 
Panel B. Middle East and North Africa (14 countries) 
Δ Oil Abundance (t-1) 0.0406 0.2228 -0.0387 0.0049 -0.0494       
 [0.0198] [0.0496] [0.0146] [0.0089] [0.0074]       
Δ Oil Dependence (t-1)       -0.2397* -0.0351 -0.3851** -0.0417 -0.2789 
       [0.0389] [0.1224] [0.0428] [0.0228] [0.0316] 
Δ GDP per capita (t-1) 0.3318 -0.1922 0.4838* 0.2159 0.3885*  0.1035 -0.0833 0.0574 0.0750 0.2067 
 [0.0817] [0.2249] [0.0652] [0.0327] [0.0351]  [0.0509] [0.1268] [0.0365] [0.0245] [0.0259] 
Δ GDP growth (t-1) 0.0560 -0.0090 0.0081 -0.0170 0.0771  0.0377 -0.0011 0.0421 0.0287 0.0869 
 [0.0139] [0.0370] [0.0114] [0.0073] [0.0067]  [0.0127] [0.0293] [0.0087] [0.0069] [0.0065] 
Δ Openness (t-1) 0.5341* 0.0804 0.2147 -0.0098 -0.0174  0.2789 0.1422 0.1666 0.0516 0.0474 
 [0.0433] [0.1191] [0.0308] [0.0209] [0.0196]  [0.0372] [0.0935] [0.0267] [0.0189] [0.0186] 
Δ (ln) Population (t-1) -0.1926 -0.1145 -0.1223 -0.0360 -0.0444  -0.1662 -0.1184 -0.1926** -0.0899 -0.0321 
 [0.2315] [0.6456] [0.1662] [0.0864] [0.1027]  [0.1698] [0.5158] [0.1300] [0.0821] [0.0905] 
Δ Rule of law (t-1) 0.3621*** -0.0530 0.3615*** 0.0426 0.3842**  0.2650* -0.0755 0.1897 0.0787 0.4097** 
 [0.1269] [0.1783] [0.0954] [0.0616] [0.0774]  [0.1442] [0.1852] [0.1021] [0.0473] [0.0799] 
Hansen J: P-value 0.7403 0.7393 0.3294 0.4867 0.6211  0.9274 0.7724 0.7261 0.8107 0.8971 
Observations 6810 6810 6810 6810 6810  6660 6660 6660 6660 6660 
Panel C. Sub-Saharan Africa (38 countries) 
Δ Oil Abundance (t-1) -0.193 -0.168 -0.228 -0.046 -0.785       
 [0.056] [0.336] [0.078] [0.027] [0.037]       
Δ Oil Dependence (t-1)       -0.229*** -0.029 -0.330** -0.316 -0.279** 
       [0.021] [0.188] [0.025] [0.437] [0.019] 
Δ GDP per capita (t-1) -0.629** -0.854* -0.246 -0.353 -0.512**  -0.174 -0.266 0.037 0.867 0.050 
 [0.134] [0.726] [0.292] [0.148] [0.063]  [0.230] [0.340] [0.295] [0.284] [0.207] 
Δ GDP growth (t-1) 0.367 0.003 0.795 -0.132 -0.138  -1.114 0.279 -1.247 -3.985 -1.898 
 [0.154] [0.083] [0.269] [0.112] [0.148]  [0.314] [0.410] [0.396] [0.578] [0.342] 
Δ Openness (t-1) 0.075 0.120 -0.020 0.054 0.169  0.107 0.027 0.135* 0.210 0.108 
 [0.020] [0.054] [0.040] [0.016] [0.017]  [0.013] [0.038] [0.011] [0.057] [0.009] 
Δ (ln) Population (t-1) -0.165 -0.004 -0.002 -0.323 0.068  -0.013 -0.014 0.072 0.186 0.054 
 [1.097] [0.605] [0.167] [1.362] [0.111]  [0.123] [0.239] [0.086] [0.213] [0.085] 
Δ Rule of law (t-1) 0.276*** -0.012 0.200 0.181 0.390***  0.246*** 0.128 0.316* 0.425 0.259** 
 [0.101] [0.349] [0.319] [0.112] [0.083]  [0.093] [0.420] [0.164] [0.317] [0.073] 
Hansen J: P-value 0.110 0.360 0.257 0.358 0.395  0.088 0.721 0.237 0.331 0.115 
Observations 1670 1696 1670 1670 1670  1655 1655 1655 1655 1655 
Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. All regressions were carried out using dynamic System-GMM panel 
VAR methodology (pvar command on stata). Hansen overidentification p values greater than 0.05, this imply that we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
which states that instruments used are valid.  
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Then re-estimate the same specifications separately for three regional groups and present the results 
in Table 4. Panel A presents PVAR results for LAC countries while Panel B and C present the results 
for MENA and SSA countries, respectively. The System-GMM Panel VAR estimates in Table 4 reveal 
that the effect of oil wealth on democracy in the three regional groups depends on  type of oil wealth 
(abundance/dependence) measure.  
First, unlike for the full sample, oil abundance does not have any significant effects on each of the 
five democracy measures for Middle East and North Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and 
Sub-Saharan Africa countries (Table 4, Columns 1-5). This empirical evidence is the same with the 
line of existing empirical studies such as O’Connor et al. (2018) who find similar results and suggest 
that oil abundance has no long-term effect on democracy in Middle East and North Africa. 
Second, when we measure oil wealth in term of oil dependence (oil value as a share of GDP). for LAC 
countries (Panel A, Columns 6-10) oil dependence does not have any significant effect on five 
democracy measures. 
For MENA countries (Panel B, Columns 6-10), we find that oil dependence has a negative effect 
on electoral democracy. For SSA countries (Panel C, Columns 6-10), we find that oil dependence has 
a negative and significant effect on three measures of democratic-institution namely electoral, 
deliberative and egalitarian democracy (Table 4, Columns 6-10). This evidence indicates that oil 
dependence hinders democracy in MENA and SSA countries. These results are consistent with 
Andersen and Aslaksen (2013), Aslaksen (2010), Murshed (2004, 2018) and Ross (2001) – and also, 
with Jensen and Wantchekon (2004) and Anyanwu et al. 2014, who confirmed the resource curse in 
SSA countries.  In addition, the insignificant oil abundance-democracy relationship in LAC countries, 
mentioned above, are unexpected since oil wealth in Latin America has traditionally been considered 
a blessing in several of the earlier studies (Ahmadov 2014, Dunning 2008, Menaldo 2016 and Smith 
and Kraus 2005). One possible explanation for this unexpected result is an indirect effect of oil wealth 
on democracy through institutional quality, which lead us to re-estimate the relationship by including 
the interaction term in Model I and II identified above.  
Conditional effect of oil wealth on democracy: Institutional context 
Next, we investigate whether the effect of oil wealth on democracy is conditional on institutional 
quality.  Some studies have considered that the effect of oil wealth on democracy depends on the 
quality of institutions. Nations with strong institutions are supposed to have an advantage to benefit 
from oil wealth, whereas the nations with weak institutions are subjected to the political resource curse 
(Dunning 2008, Jensen and Wantchekon 2004, Ross 2012 and Smith, 2007).  According to Dunning 
(2008), the influence of oil wealth on democracy can be both direct and indirect. To crystallize the 
indirect effects of oil abundance and oil dependence on democracy via institutional quality, the more 
powerful approach that has been used  in primary studies is by including an interaction term between 
the quality of institutions and oil wealth in both previous models to understand the role of strong 
institutions in the democracy impact of oil wealth. We use the rule of law as an indicator of institutional 
quality. Accordingly, the new estimation models are: 
ΔDi,t = A1 ΔDi,t−1 + A2 Δ(Oil Abundance)i,t−1 + A3Δ(Oil Abundance ∗ Rule of Law)i,t−1 + BΔ(X)i,t−1 +δi+ωt + μi,t   (III)  
 
ΔDit = B1ΔDi,t−1 + B2 Δ(Oil Dependence)i,t−1 + B3Δ(Oil Dependence ∗ Rule of Law)i,t−1 + PΔ(X)i,t−1+γi + ∂t + εi,t    (IV) 
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Where rule of law is a proxy to institutional quality, 𝐴3 captures the effect of the interaction between 
oil abundance and institutional quality on democracy, and 𝐵3 captures the effect of the interaction 
between oil dependence and institutional quality on democracy. Figure 3 describes in graphical form 
the direct and indirect effects (via the institutional-strength channel) of oil wealth on the democratic 
institutions; these effects are represented by solid and dashed arrows. 
Figure 3 
Oil wealth and democratic institutions: Direct and Indirect Links. 
Source: Authors. Solid arrow = direct link; dashed arrow = indirect link. 
 
Table 5, reports estimates of the effects of the oil–institutional quality interaction on each of the five 
democratic-institution measures based on the dynamic System-GMM panel VAR model. The 
estimates of the indirect effect of oil abundance, A3 in Model III, are presented in the Columns (1–5). 
The estimates of the indirect effect of oil dependence, 𝐵3 in Model IV, are presented in the Columns 
(6–10).  
The results of the conditional effect turn out to be fairly impressive. For the full sample and the five 
country groups, the negative or insignificant effect of oil wealth has switched to be positive. The 
estimates for oil abundance and oil dependence are positive and highly significant at 1 % level for 
almost all of the specifications, which suggests that some of the effects of oil wealth on each of the 
five democratic-institution measures are assisted by its effect on institutional quality. 
The results support the claim that the effect of oil abundance and oil dependence on democracy 
is conditional on the quality of institutions. This finding confirms the studies of Dunning (2008), who 
shows that the positive effect of oil on democracy is conditional on levels of income inequality, and 
those of Bhavnani et al. (2016) and Mehlum et al (2006), for whom the significant factor is the quality 
of institutions. Ross (2012) argued that the resource curse is entirely confined to countries with bad 
institutions. Jensen and Wantchekon (2004) also argue that resource-rich countries can become 
democratic only If they choose to strengthen their institutions of accountability within the state. 
Moreover, this outcome implies that oil abundance and oil dependence promote democracy in indirect 
ways through strong institutions. Turning now to the subsample for MENA (Panel E). These results 
indicate that institutional quality does succeed in turning the oil curse into a blessing when we consider 
oil abundance. For oil dependence, we observe that the estimates of the interaction term are negative, 
which indicate that  institutional quality fails in turning the oil curse into a blessing. Instead, it reduces 
the negative impact of oil dependence on democracy. Oil dependence is more important in retarding 





Table 5   The effect of oil - institutional quality interaction on each of the five democratic-institution measures:   
Oil Abundance vs Oil Dependence (1932–2014). System-GMM panel VAR. 























Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Panel A. full sample (96 countries) 
Δ (Oil Abund×Rule of Law) t-1  0.541*** 0.280*** 0.437*** 0.356*** 0.529***       
 [0.030] [0.038] [0.021] [0.018] [0.017]       
Δ (Oil Depend×Rule of Law) t-1        0.150*** 0.135*** 0.070 0.155*** 0.194*** 
       [0.042] [0.090] [0.029] [0.028] [0.022] 
Hansen J: P-value 0.361 0.407 0.130 0.368 0.402  0.048 0.179 0.006 0.228 0.023 
Observations 4480 4480 4480 4480 4480  4415 4415 4415 4415 4415 
Panel B. Small-scale Oil Endowment (30 countries) 
Δ (Oil Abund×Rule of Law) t-1  0.188** -0.029 0.201** 0.233*** 0.216**       
 [0.017] [0.056] [0.017] [0.012] [0.012]       
Δ (Oil Depend×Rule of Law) t-1        0.262*** -0.457*** -0.096* 0.220*** 0.339*** 
       [0.037] [0.153] [0.024] [0.019] [0.026] 
Observations 0.053 0.043 0.047 0.051 0.140  0.427 0.281 0.221 0.184 0.320 
 1513 1513 1513 1513 1513  1484 1484 1484 1484 1484 
Panel C. Large-scale Oil Endowment (30 countries) 
Δ (Oil Abund×Rule of Law) t-1  1.091*** 0.273 0.895*** 0.503* 0.793***       
 [0.048] [0.102] [0.040] [0.029] [0.028]       
Δ (Oil Depend×Rule of Law) t-1        0.177*** 0.011 0.240*** 0.209*** 0.205*** 
       [0.053] [0.107] [0.041] [0.028] [0.027] 
Hansen J: P-value 0.536 0.672 0.735 0.365 0.538  0.285 0.402 0.508 0.441 0.177 
Observations 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527  1491 1491 1491 1491 1491 
Panel D. Latin America and Caribbean (22 countries) 
Δ (Oil Abund×Rule of Law) t-1  0.526*** 0.695*** 0.260* 0.254 0.598***       
 [0.034] [0.072] [0.028] [0.026] [0.020]       
Δ (Oil Depend×Rule of Law) t-1        0.310*** 0.436*** 0.109** -0.094** 0.178*** 
       [0.055] [0.152] [0.057] [0.037] [0.035] 
Hansen J: P-value 0.153 0.089 0.318 0.116 0.130  0.356 0.215 0.366 0.661 0.259 
Observations 1246 1246 1246 1246 1246  1231 1231 1231 1231 1231 
Panel E. Middle East and North Africa (14 countries) 
Δ (Oil Abund×Rule of Law) t-1  1.278*** 0.383* 0.844*** 0.561*** 0.683**       
 [0.039] [0.097] [0.033] [0.019] [0.023]       
Δ (Oil Depend×Rule of Law) t-1       -0.146*** -0.168** 0.040 -0.065 0.019 
       [0.067] [0.288] [0.056] [0.032] [0.052] 
Hansen J: P-value 0.455 0.644 0.794 0.327 0.696  0.143 0.759 0.490 0.790 0.790 
Observations 665 665 665 665 665  650 650 650 650 650 
Panel F.  Sub-Saharan Africa (38 countries) 
Δ (Oil Abund×Rule of Law) t-1  0.129*** 0.043 0.110 0.324*** 0.145*       
 [0.010] [0.037] [0.011] [0.011] [0.009]       
Δ (Oil Depend×Rule of Law) t-1        0.065*** 0.249*** 0.179*** 0.295*** 0.141*** 
       [0.017] [0.092] [0.026] [0.023] [0.016] 
Hansen J: P-value 0.012 0.051 0.464 0.616 0.312  0.066 0.418 0.024 0.113 0.041 
Observations 1509 1509 1547 1547 1547  1502 1540 1540 1540 1540 
Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. All regressions were carried out using dynamic System-GMM panel 
VAR methodology (pvar command on Stata). Hansen overidentification p values greater than 0.05 for almost all of the specifications, this imply that we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis which states that instruments used are valid.  
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In that regard, we would like to highlight some important points. Overall, when we consider the 
full sample of developing countries, we find a robust evidence supporting oil hinders-democracy 
hypothesis for the both of oil wealth (abundance/dependence) measure. Our results provide strong 
evidence for the conditionality of the political resource curse 'conditionalists view'. Hence, this paper’s 
findings provide evidence to reassure that oil abundance does not hinder democracy and can even be 
a blessing rather than a curse under the conditionalist view. However, a part of our findings diverges 
from the studies of Anderson and Ross 2014; Ahmadov 2014; Aslaksen 2010; Christian Houle 2018; 
Murshed 2004; Jensen and Wantchekon 2004; Ross 2001, 2008, 2009, 2012 and 2013; and Goldberg, 
Wibbels and Myukiyehe 2008, which claim that increased oil abundance retards democracy. This 
inconsistency may be attributed to the use of the new V-DEM dataset, which was not employed in 
any of these studies. 
5 Further Robustness Checks 
In this section we report on several exercises to ensure the robustness of our baseline results, we have 
conducted several changes – as follows: 
✓ The substitution of the key independent variables; 
✓ The substitution of the oil–institutional quality interaction; 
✓ The substitution of the dependent variables; and 
✓ Using four different temporal breaks (i.e.  the post-1970, the post-1980, the post-1990 and the 
post-2008 period) 
Reassuringly, the results (reported in Table A.3- A.5 in Appendix A) show that our main results are 
not driven by these changes. In what fellow, we will consider each of these several changes in turn. 
5.1 Substitution of the key independent variables 
For the data shown in Table A.2, we use the System-GMM panel VAR estimation method in order to 
further test the results. We examine whether the baseline results hold when two alternative measures 
of oil wealth are employed as a proxy for oil wealth. The first one is the log of oil income per capita 
plus (1); the second is the log of oil income as share of GDP plus (1). Both are taken from the dataset 
constructed by Haber and Menaldo (2011). In the first column, we repeat for comparison purposes 
the estimates of oil value per capita obtained from the base System-GMM panel VAR estimation 
method in Tables 2-4. The results for the alternative measures of oil abundance are shown in the 
second Column. In Column 6, we repeat the estimates of Oil Value as % of GDP obtained from the 
base System-GMM panel VAR estimation method in Tables 2-4. The results for the alternative 
measure of oil dependence are reported in Column 7. Reassuringly, as we can also see in Table A.2, 
the effects of the alternative indicator of oil abundance and oil dependence on each of the five 
democracy measures in the full sample and for each of the country groups are consistent with our 
baseline estimations – with only a couple of exceptions. One of these is found in Panel A, Column 2: 
the positive effect of abundance on electoral democracy in the large oil endowed countries has 
vanished and become insignificant, but the positive signs remain.  
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5.2 Substitution of the oil–institutional quality interaction 
In Table A.2, we examine whether the baseline results in Table 5 hold when an alternative measure of 
institutional quality is employed. To that end, we used the accountability index, taken from the V-
DEM dataset, as a proxy for institutional quality. In Column 4, we repeat for comparison purposes 
the estimates of the interaction term between oil value per capita and accountability from Table 5. The 
results for the alternative measure of interaction term between oil abundance and institutional quality 
are reported in Column 5. In Column 9, we repeat the estimates of the interaction term between Oil 
Value as % of GDP and rule of law obtained from the base System-GMM panel VAR estimation 
method in Table 5.  
The results for the alternative measure of the interaction term between oil dependence and 
institutional quality are reported in Column 10. Reassuringly, as we can also see in Table A.2, the 
effects of the alternative measure of the oil–institutional-quality interaction for each of the five 
democracy measures in the full sample and for each of the country groups are consistent with our 
baseline estimations – with only a couple of exceptions. One of these comes in Panel C, Column 5: 
the insignificant effect of the interaction term on deliberative democracy in SSA countries turns out 
to be positive highly significant at 1% level. 
5.3 Substitution of the dependent variables  
In Table A.2, we replace the dependent variable with an alternative indicator of democracy. In 
Columns 3 and 8, democratic institution is measured by the Polity index, which is the most frequently 
used measure. As we can see from Table A.2, the main results from Tables 3 and 4 remain unaltered. 
Only a couple of estimates have changed – and those insignificantly.  
5.4 Using three different temporal breaks 
Some studies have argued that the effects of oil wealth on political institutions should have differed 
over time and only appeared after the first great oil boom (1973), when oil prices experienced a 
significant increase that drove the oil-exporting countries to nationalize the assets of foreign-owned 
oil companies in the 1980s. Andersen and Ross 2014 argued that petroleum wealth’s impact on 
democracy becomes negative in the post break period (post-1980 period). While Hendrix’s (2018) 
argued that the adverse effect of oil on democracy grew substantially more in the post-Cold War 
period (post-1990). Based on these studies, we have chosen three different temporal breaks to check 
whether if our main results will hold or not.  
(a) Following to Haber and Menaldo 2011 our first post break period is post-1970, we re-estimate 
our main models by adding an interaction term between oil wealth measures 
(abundance/dependence) and a post-1970 dummy variable. which takes the value 0 for the years 
1932 to 1970 and 1 for the years 1971-2014. 
(b) Following to Andersen and Ross 2014 our second post break period is post-1980, we add an 
interaction term between oil wealth measures (abundance/dependence) and a post-1980 dummy 
variable. which takes the value 0 for the years 1932 to 1980 and 1 for the years 1981-2014. 
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(c) Following to Hendrix’s (2018) our third post break period is post-1990, we add an interaction 
term between oil wealth measures (abundance/dependence) and a post-1990 dummy variable. 
which takes the value 0 for the years 1932 to 1990 and 1 for the years 1991-2014. 
Table A.3 and A.4 in Appendix A present the System-GMM panel VAR estimation results in order 
to examine whether the four different temporal breaks drove our baseline results. In each table, we 
repeat for comparison purposes the estimates of oil abundance and dependence (Column 1) obtained 
from the base System-GMM panel VAR estimation method in Tables 2-4. The results for temporal 
break of post-1970 are shown in the second Column. While Column 2-3 represent the results for post-
1980 period and post-1990 period, respectively.  
Reassuringly, as we can also see in Columns 2-4 of Table A.3 and A.4, the effects of the term 
interacting oil abundance and oil dependence with the post-1970 period, post-1980 period, post-1990 
period and post-2008 period on each of the five democracy measures in the full sample and for each 
of the country groups did not lead to any substantial change in the main results as reported in Tables 
2-4, with but a couple of exceptions. For instance, the insignificant negative effect of oil abundance 
on electoral democracy in small oil endowed countries becomes statistically significant at 10% level 
with negative sign post-1980 period. 
6 Conclusion 
This paper has explored empirically the long-term effects of oil abundance and oil dependence on five 
measures of democracy over the period 1932–2014 in 95 developing countries and in five country 
groups – namely, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Latin America and the Caribbean 
(LAC), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and large- and small-scale oil endowed countries. In doing so, we 
employed the System-GMM panel VAR estimation method to take into account the potential 
problems of endogeneity. Our empirical findings strongly suggest mixed evidence, we find a support 
to oil hinders-democracy hypothesis for both of oil wealth (abundance/ dependence) measure across 
the full sample of developing countries. But once we break the sample, there exists substantial 
evidence for supporting the conditionality of the political resource curse. In other word, we find that 
oil wealth has different effects in the context of oil abundancy, geographic regions, and institutional 
aspects. More importantly, it seems that oil abundance does not hinder democracy over the period 
1932-2014 in most sub-samples and in some instances can even be a blessing rather than a curse. 
Moreover, four conclusions stand out: 
First, in oil abundancy context, when we measure oil wealth in term of oil abundance, oil 
abundance does not have any significant effect on democracy in small-scale oil countries. While in 
large-scale oil countries, oil abundance does have a positive and significant effect on electoral and 
liberal democracy. These results suggest that oil abundance promotes democracy in large-scale oil 
countries. This result is similar to those obtained by Bruckner et al. 2012, Gurses 2009, Herb 2004, 
Liou and Musgrave 2014, Menaldo 2016 and Wacziarg 2012 who found a convincing evidence that 
oil wealth is good for democracy. For the other measure of oil wealth (oil dependence), there exist no 
long-run relationship between oil dependence and the five measures of democracy during the period 
1932–2014 for small and large-scale oil countries. This empirical finding supports the view put forward 
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by Haber & Menaldo (2011) and O’Connor et al, 2018, who suggest that natural resources and 
democracy are unrelated. 
Second, in geographic regions context, our estimation results show that oil abundance does not 
have any significant effects on each of the five democracy measures in LAC, MENA and SSA 
countries. oil dependence has negative effects but not on all the five measures of democracy in the 
same three regional groups. This evidence indicates that oil dependence hinders democracy in LAC 
countries as well as MENA and SSA countries. LAC countries display no long-term effects on any of 
the five measures of democracy from oil abundance and two measures of democracy from oil 
dependence. This is not entirely surprising as the history of democracy is weaker in these two regions 
compared to Latin America. This supports the conclusion of Ross’ (2009) study, which concluded 
that the ultimate effect of oil wealth will vary under different conditions, as well as Ahmadov’s (2013) 
findings, which support the idea that the oil–democracy relationship varies across the world’s regions. 
Third, once we control for institutional quality in the form of rule of law, System-GMM panel  
VAR estimation results suggest that institutional quality plays a crucial role in altering the oil–
democracy link across the full sample and all country groups. In other words, oil does not hamper 
democracy if the institutional setting is positive – a finding that supports the conditionalist view 
(Brooks and Kurtz 2016; Dunning 2008). In MENA case,  the results also indicate that oil dependence 
especially retards democratic advances. 
Fourth, the estimation results clearly imply that the effect of oil on democracy in small oil countries 
has differed depends on two types of oil wealth (abundance/dependence). Thus, it is worthy to make 
a distinction between these two types of oil wealth to better understand the oil-democracy relationship.  
These results are robust for several checks: (i) Using alternative measures of oil abundance and oil 
dependence; (ii) Substituting oil–institutional quality interaction; (iii) Using alternative measure of 
democracy; and (iv) Using three different temporal breaks (i.e.  the post-1970, the post-1980, the post-
1990 period). 
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Table A.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 Country by Group 















 mean s. d mean s. d mean s. d mean s. d mean s. d mean s. d mean s. d 
                                          Panel A. key Independent Variables 
 
Oil value per capita (ln) 1932 2.46 2.08 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.19 3.66 1.38 3.95 1.49 3.43 3.59 0.38 1.13 
Oil value per capita (ln) 2014 2.94 3.13 0.00 0.00 3.00 1.88 6.81 1.66 3.31 3.33 5.65 3.35 1.83 2.87 
Oil value per capita (ln) 1932-2014 2.30 2.85 0.00 0.00 1.86 1.74 5.20 2.74 2.83 2.81 5.01 3.50 1.09 2.30 
Oil Value as % of GDP 1932 0.11 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.29 0.22 0.38 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.01 
Oil Value as % of GDP 2014 0.18 0.53 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.41 0.45 0.82 0.13 0.36 0.19 0.26 0.22 0.70 
Oil Value as % of GDP 1932-2014 0.16 0.59 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.69 0.37 0.71 0.12 0.36 0.25 0.40 0.14 0.57 
                       Panel B. Dependent Variables 
Electoral democracy 1932 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.21 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.17 0.09 
Electoral democracy 2014 0.49 0.22 0.50 0.20 0.53 0.22 0.43 0.22 0.65 0.20 0.31 0.19 0.45 0.18 
Electoral democracy 1932-2014 0.27 0.23 0.28 0.23 0.29 0.23 0.25 0.22 0.41 0.26 0.16 0.15 0.22 0.19 
Liberal democracy 1932 0.28 0.20 0.27 0.17 0.26 0.19 0.30 0.24 0.31 0.25 0.36 0.22 0.29 0.22 
Liberal democracy 2014 0.55 0.28 0.55 0.27 0.60 0.29 0.49 0.28 0.58 0.31 0.56 0.26 0.49 0.28 
Liberal democracy 1932-2014 0.36 0.27 0.37 0.27 0.36 0.28 0.35 0.26 0.41 0.30 0.39 0.24 0.32 0.25 
Participatory democracy 1932 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.05 
Participatory democracy 2014 0.30 0.16 0.31 0.15 0.33 0.16 0.26 0.17 0.43 0.16 0.17 0.11 0.26 0.12 
Participatory democracy 1932-2014 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.25 0.18 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.11 
Deliberative democracy 1932 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.08 
Deliberative democracy 2014 0.37 0.20 0.38 0.20 0.43 0.20 0.31 0.20 0.51 0.22 0.23 0.16 0.34 0.18 
Deliberative democracy 1932-2014 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.16 0.18 0.29 0.24 0.12 0.11 0.15 0.16 
Egalitarian democracy 1932 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.07 
Egalitarian democracy 2014 0.33 0.18 0.33 0.17 0.38 0.19 0.28 0.18 0.44 0.20 0.21 0.13 0.30 0.15 
Egalitarian democracy 1932-2014 0.19 0.16 0.19 0.17 0.21 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.26 0.21 0.14 0.09 0.15 0.13 
                                          Panel C. Other Independent Variables 
GDP per capita (ln) 7.91 1.10 7.54 0.86 7.83 0.91 8.49 1.30 8.32 0.72 8.83 1.47 7.42 0.87 
Openness  5.45 2.16 4.46 1.71 5.90 2.25 6.03 2.13 5.25 2.17 6.12 2.07 4.78 1.69 
Population (ln) 15.63 1.70 15.05 1.49 15.95 1.63 16.04 1.83 15.64 1.57 15.28 1.86 15.58 1.55 
Rule of law 0.43 0.24 0.44 0.27 0.47 0.21 0.36 0.22 0.45 0.29 0.36 0.18 0.40 0.22 
Number of countries 98 43 34 34 17 24 44 
Notes: Countries are classified into five groups, two of those groups according to the scale of their oil endowment. To determine whether an oil country 
has large or small oil endowment, we calculate the median of average oil value per capita over the full sample period 1932–2014 (which is 3.85). Sample 




Table A.2 Oil Wealth and Democracy: Alternative Measures of Oil Abundance and Oil dependence. 
Alternative Measures of democracy. Alternative Measures of Oil-Institutional strength interaction. 



































Panel A. Dependent Variable: Δ (Electoral Democracy) 
Δ (Oil Wealth) t-1 (full sample) 
 
Δ (Oil Wealth) t-1 (small oil) 
 
Δ (Oil Wealth) t-1 (Big oil) 
 
Δ (Oil Wealth) t-1 (LAC) 
 
Δ (Oil Wealth) t-1 (MENA) 
 



























































































































Panel B. Dependent Variable: Δ (Liberal Democracy) 
Δ (Oil Wealth) t-1 (full sample) 
 
Δ (Oil Wealth) t-1 (small oil) 
 
Δ (Oil Wealth) t-1 (Big oil) 
 
Δ (Oil Wealth) t-1 (LAC) 
 
Δ (Oil Wealth) t-1 (MENA) 
 



























































































































Panel C. Dependent Variable: Δ (Deliberative Democracy) 
Δ (Oil Wealth) t-1 (full sample) 
 
Δ (Oil Wealth) t-1 (small oil) 
 
Δ (Oil Wealth) t-1 (Big oil) 
 
Δ (Oil Wealth) t-1 (LAC) 
 
Δ (Oil Wealth) t-1 (MENA) 
 



























































































































Panel D. Dependent Variable: Δ (Participatory Democracy) 
Δ (Oil Wealth) t-1 (full sample) 
 
Δ (Oil Wealth) t-1 (small oil) 
 
Δ (Oil Wealth) t-1 (Big oil) 
 
Δ (Oil Wealth) t-1 (LAC) 
 
Δ (Oil Wealth) t-1 (MENA) 
 



























































































































Panel E. Dependent Variable: Δ (Egalitarian Democracy) 
Δ (Oil Wealth) t-1 (full sample) 
 
Δ (Oil Wealth) t-1 (small oil) 
 
Δ (Oil Wealth) t-1 (Big oil) 
 
Δ (Oil Wealth) t-1 (LAC) 
 
Δ (Oil Wealth) t-1 (MENA) 
 


























































































































Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. All regressions were carried out using dynamic System-GMM panel 
VAR methodology (pvar command on Stata). HM = Haber Menaldo 2011 APSR Dataset. 
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Table A.3 Effect of Oil Abundance on Democracy: Using Different Temporal Breaks 
Oil Abundance (Oil Value per capita) and Democracy 













Panel A. Dependent Variable: Δ (Electoral Democracy) 
Δ (Oil Abundance) t-1× Post-year dummy (Full Sample) 
 
Δ (Oil Abundance) t-1× Post-year dummy (Small oil) 
 
Δ (Oil Abundance) t-1× Post-year dummy (Big oil) 
 
Δ (Oil Abundance) t-1 × Post-year dummy (LAC) 
 
Δ (Oil Abundance) t-1 × Post-year dummy (MENA) 
 


















































Panel B. Dependent Variable: Δ (Liberal Democracy) 
Δ (Oil Abundance) t-1 × Post-year dummy (Full Sample) 
 
Δ (Oil Abundance) t-1 × Post-year dummy (Small oil) 
 
Δ (Oil Abundance) t-1 × Post-year dummy (Big oil) 
 
Δ (Oil Abundance) t-1 × Post-year dummy (LAC) 
 
Δ (Oil Abundance) t-1 × Post-year dummy (MENA) 
 


















































Panel C. Dependent Variable: Δ (Deliberative Democracy) 
Δ (Oil Abundance) t-1 × Post-year dummy (Full Sample) 
 
Δ (Oil Abundance) t-1 × Post-year dummy (Small oil) 
 
Δ (Oil Abundance) t-1 × Post-year dummy (Big oil) 
 
Δ (Oil Abundance) t-1 × Post-year dummy (LAC) 
 
Δ (Oil Abundance) t-1 × Post-year dummy (MENA) 
 


















































Panel D. Dependent Variable: Δ (Participatory Democracy) 
Δ (Oil Abundance) t-1 × Post-year dummy (Full Sample) 
 
Δ (Oil Abundance) t-1 × Post-year dummy (Small oil) 
 
Δ (Oil Abundance) t-1 × Post-year dummy (Big oil) 
 
Δ (Oil Abundance) t-1 × Post-year dummy (LAC) 
 
Δ (Oil Abundance) t-1 × Post-year dummy (MENA) 
 


















































Panel E. Dependent Variable: Δ (Egalitarian Democracy) 
Δ (Oil Abundance) t-1 × Post-year dummy (Full Sample) 
 
Δ (Oil Abundance) t-1 × Post-year dummy (Small oil) 
 
Δ (Oil Abundance) t-1 × Post-year dummy (Big oil) 
 
Δ (Oil Abundance) t-1 × Post-year dummy (LAC) 
 
Δ (Oil Abundance) t-1 × Post-year dummy (MENA) 
 


















































Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. All regressions were carried out using dynamic System-




Table A.4 Effect of Oil Dependence on Democracy: Using Different Temporal Breaks 
Oil Dependence (Oil Value as % of GDP) and Democracy 













Panel A. Dependent Variable: Δ (Electoral Democracy) 
Δ (Oil Dependence) t-1 × Post-year dummy (Full Sample) 
 
Δ (Oil Dependence) t-1 × Post-year dummy (Small oil) 
 
Δ (Oil Dependence) t-1 × Post-year dummy (Big oil) 
 
Δ (Oil Dependence) t-1 × Post-year dummy (LAC) 
 
Δ (Oil Dependence) t-1 × Post-year dummy (MENA) 
 


















































Panel B. Dependent Variable: Δ (Liberal Democracy) 
Δ (Oil Dependence) t-1 × Post-year dummy (Full Sample) 
 
Δ (Oil Dependence) t-1 × Post-year dummy (Small oil) 
 
Δ (Oil Dependence) t-1 × Post-year dummy (Big oil) 
 
Δ (Oil Dependence) t-1 × Post-year dummy (LAC) 
 
Δ (Oil Dependence) t-1 × Post-year dummy (MENA) 
 


















































Panel C. Dependent Variable: Δ (Deliberative Democracy) 
Δ (Oil Dependence) t-1 × Post-year dummy (Full Sample) 
 
Δ (Oil Dependence) t-1 × Post-year dummy (Small oil) 
 
Δ (Oil Dependence) t-1 × Post-year dummy (Big oil) 
 
Δ (Oil Dependence) t-1 × Post-year dummy (LAC) 
 
Δ (Oil Dependence) t-1 × Post-year dummy (MENA) 
 


















































Panel D. Dependent Variable: Δ (Participatory Democracy) 
Δ (Oil Dependence) t-1 × Post-year dummy (Full Sample) 
 
Δ (Oil Dependence) t-1 × Post-year dummy (Small oil) 
 
Δ (Oil Dependence) t-1 × Post-year dummy (Big oil) 
 
Δ (Oil Dependence) t-1 × Post-year dummy (LAC) 
 
Δ (Oil Dependence) t-1 × Post-year dummy (MENA) 
 


















































Panel E. Dependent Variable: Δ (Egalitarian Democracy) 
Δ (Oil Dependence) t-1 × Post-year dummy (Full Sample) 
 
Δ (Oil Dependence) t-1 × Post-year dummy (Small oil) 
 
Δ (Oil Dependence) t-1 × Post-year dummy (Big oil) 
 
Δ (Oil Dependence) t-1 × Post-year dummy (LAC) 
 
Δ (Oil Dependence) t-1 × Post-year dummy (MENA) 
 


















































Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. All regressions were carried out using dynamic System-GMM 




Table S. 1: List of Countries and their classifications 
Middle East and North 
Africa 
Latin America and Caribbean Sub/Saharan Africa Rest Sample  
1) Algeria (Large oil) 
2) Egypt (Low oil) 
3) Iraq (Large oil) 
4) Jordan 
5) Libya (Large oil) 
6) Morocco  
7) Oman (Large oil) 
8) Qatar (Large oil) 
9) Saudi Arabia (Large oil) 
10) Sudan (Low oil) 
11) Syria (Low oil) 
12) Tunisia (Low oil) 
13) Arab Emirates (Large oil) 
14) Yemen (Low oil) 
1) Argentina (Large oil) 
2) Bolivia (Low oil) 
3) Brazil (Low oil) 
4) Chile (Low oil) 
5) Colombia (Large oil) 
6) Costa Rica 
7) Cuba 
8) Dominican Republic 
9) Ecuador (Low oil) 






16) Mexico (Large oil) 
17) Panama 
18) Paraguay 
19) Peru (Low oil) 
20) Suriname 
21) Uruguay 
22) Venezuela (Large oil) 
1) Angola (Large oil) 
2) Benin 
3) Botswana 
4) Burkina Faso 
5) Burundi 
6) Cameroon (Small oil) 
7) Central African Republic 
8) Chad (Small oil) 
9) Comoros 
10) Congo, Dem. Rep. 
11) Congo, Rep. (Large oil) 
12) Cote d'Ivoire 
13) Equatorial Guinea 
14) Ethiopia 
15) Gabon (Large oil) 














30) Nigeria (Large oil) 
31) Rwanda 
32) Senegal 
33) Sierra Leone 
34) Somalia 











5) China (Small oil) 
6) Fiji 
7) Hungary (Small oil) 
8) India (Small oil) 
9) Indonesia (Small oil) 
10) Korea, Rep. 
11) Laos 




16) Papua New Guinea (Small oil) 
17) Philippines 
18) Poland 
19) Romania (Large oil) 
20) Sri Lanka 
21) Taiwan 
22) Thailand (Small oil) 
23) Vietnam (Small oil) 
14 Countries 22 Countries 41 Countries 23 Countries 




Table S. 2 The Main Five Outcome Variables 





The electoral principle of democracy embodies the core value of making 
rulers responsive to citizens through competition for the approval of a 
broad electorate during periodic elections, as captured by Dahl’s (1971, 





The liberal component of democracy embodies the intrinsic value of 
protecting individual and minority rights against a potential “tyranny of 
the majority.” This is achieved through constitutionally protected civil 
liberties, strong rule of law, and effective checks and balances that limit 





The deliberative component enshrines the core value that political 
decisions in pursuit of the public good should be informed by respectful 
and reasonable dialogue at all levels rather than by emotional appeals, 





The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active participation 
by citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral. It is 
motivated by uneasiness about a bedrock practice of electoral democracy: 
delegating authority to representatives. Thus, direct rule by citizens is 
preferred, wherever practicable. This model of democracy thus takes 
suffrage for granted, emphasizing engagement in civil society 





The egalitarian principle of democracy holds that material and immaterial 
inequalities inhibit the exercise of formal rights and liberties, and diminish 
the ability of citizens from all social groups to participate. Egalitarian 
democracy is achieved when 1 rights and freedoms of individuals are 
protected equally across all social groups; and 2 resources are distributed 
equally across all social groups; 3 groups and individuals enjoy equal 
access to power. 
Source: V- DEM   Codebook V8.
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Table S. 3: Variable Descriptions and Sources 
Variable Names as 
Shown in Tables 
Actual Transformed Variable, if any, 
Used in Regressions 








Oil income pc 
 
Oil income GDP 
 
Log of (1+Oil Gas Value per capita) 
 
 
Log of (1+Oil Gas Value per GDP) 
 
 
Log of (1+ Oil income per PC) 
 
Log of (1+ Oil income per GDP) 
 
Where oil and gas value are the quantity of oil and gas extracted in a given 
year multiplied by the per-unit world price divided by population. 
 
Where oil and gas value are the quantity of oil and gas extracted in a given 
year multiplied by the per-unit world price divided by GDP. 
 
Total value (in 2007 dollars) of petroleum produced, divided by 
population 
Total value (in 2007 dollars) of petroleum produced, divided by GDP.  
 
Ross Mahdavi (2015), Oil and Gas 
dataset. 
 
Constructed based on Ross Mahdavi 
(2015), Oil and Gas dataset. 
 
Haber Menaldo (2011) APSR Dataset. 
 
Constructed based on Haber Menaldo 









An Index of Electoral democracy ranging from 0 to 1. 
An Index of Liberal democracy ranging from 0 to 1. 
An Index of deliberative democracy ranging from 0 to 1 
An Index of Participatory democracy ranging from 0 to 1 
An Index of Egalitarian democracy ranging from 0 to 1 
Polity Score; measuring on a scale from -10 to +10 the polity of a country 
 
V-Dem Project Coppedge et al. (2019). 
V-Dem Project Coppedge et al. (2019). 
V-Dem Project Coppedge et al. (2019). 
V-Dem Project Coppedge et al. (2019). 
V-Dem Project Coppedge et al. (2019). 
Polity IV (2017) 
Control variables: 
GDP per capita 
Population  
Trade Openness  
Rule of law  
 
Log of GDP per capita 




The gross domestic production in 2011US$ divided by population. 
Population, mid-year (thousands). 
 
 
The Maddison Project Database (2018). 
The Maddison Project Database (2018). 
V-Dem Project Coppedge et al. (2019). 
V-Dem Project Coppedge et al. (2019). 




Table S.4 Fisher-type Panel unit-root tests results Based on augmented Dickey-Fuller tests 
Variable Test Statistic (p-values) Full Sample Small Oil Large Oil MENA LAC SSA 
Oil value per 
capita (ln) 
Inverse chi-squared P 0.9975 0.925 0.0002 0 0.9999 1 
Inverse normal Z 0.9401 0.8929 0.8308 0.2119 0.5918 0.9964 
Inverse logit L* 0.4498 0.8757 0.0916 0 0.5822 0.9944 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 0.9951 0.9148 0 0 0.9979 1 
 Unit Root Support Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Δ Oil value per 
capita (ln) 
Inverse chi-squared P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Inverse normal Z 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Inverse logit L* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Stationarity Support Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Variable Test Statistic (p-values) Full Sample Small Oil Large Oil MENA LAC SSA 
Oil value GDP 
Inverse chi-squared P 0.9975 0.0614 0.1643 0.2177 0.9753 0.9935 
Inverse normal Z 0.9401 0.1686 0.1291 0.2078 0.2132 0.2347 
Inverse logit L* 0.4498 0.1002 0.112 0.1836 0.2125 0.1238 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 0.9951 0.0529 0.1664 0.231 0.9603 0.9864 
 Unit Root Support Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Δ Oil value GDP 
Inverse chi-squared P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Inverse normal Z 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Inverse logit L* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Stationarity Support Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Variable Test Statistic (p-values) Full Sample Small Oil Large Oil MENA LAC SSA 
Electoral 
Inverse chi-squared P 0.9767 0.6192 0.3754 0.0175 0.9998 0.9497 
Inverse normal Z 0.9997 0.9547 0.8812 0.2687 0.9997 0.8941 
Inverse logit L* 0.9991 0.9151 0.8537 0.2065 0.9995 0.899 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 0.9708 0.6384 0.3963 0.0081 0.9974 0.9394 
 Unit Root Support Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Δ Electoral 
Inverse chi-squared P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Inverse normal Z 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Inverse logit L* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Stationarity Support Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Variable Test Statistic (p-values) Full Sample Small Oil Large Oil MENA LAC SSA 
Liberal 
Inverse chi-squared P 1 0.9992 0.9303 0.3872 0.9999 0.993 
Inverse normal Z 1 0.9999 0.9965 0.5566 1 0.9938 
Inverse logit L* 1 0.9999 0.996 0.6324 0.9999 0.9925 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 0.9999 0.996 0.9196 0.417 0.9981 0.986 
 Unit Root Support Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Δ Liberal 
Inverse chi-squared P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Inverse normal Z 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Inverse logit L* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Stationarity Support Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Variable Test Statistic (p-values) Full Sample Small Oil Large Oil MENA LAC SSA 
Participatory 
Inverse chi-squared P 1 0.9998 0.055 0.3387 1 0.9998 
Inverse normal Z 1 0.9999 0.6389 0.9019 1 0.9988 
Inverse logit L* 1 0.9997 0.5003 0.9053 1 0.9981 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 1 0.9982 0.0462 0.368 0.9994 0.9986 
 Unit Root Support Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Δ Participatory 
Inverse chi-squared P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Inverse normal Z 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Inverse logit L* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Stationarity Support Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Variable Test Statistic (p-values) Full Sample Small Oil Large Oil MENA LAC SSA 
Deliberative 
Inverse chi-squared P 0.9979 0.9998 0.9492 0.1364 0.9983 0.799 
Inverse normal Z 1 0.9991 0.9767 0.8518 0.999 0.8537 
Inverse logit L* 0.9999 0.9986 0.9752 0.8436 0.9987 0.7716 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 0.9958 0.9983 0.9372 0.1352 0.9922 0.802 
 Unit Root Support Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Δ Deliberative 
Inverse chi-squared P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Inverse normal Z 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Inverse logit L* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Stationarity Support Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Variable Test Statistic (p-values) Full Sample Small Oil Large Oil MENA LAC SSA 
Egalitarian Inverse chi-squared P 0.9999 0.9511 0.6609 0.5566 0.6129 0.9282 
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Inverse normal Z 0.9999 0.985 0.8464 0.5708 0.8102 0.8728 
Inverse logit L* 0.9998 0.9764 0.793 0.5647 0.7656 0.8675 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 0.9995 0.9393 0.6777 0.5899 0.6357 0.9192 
 Unit Root Support Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Δ Egalitarian 
Inverse chi-squared P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Inverse normal Z 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Inverse logit L* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Stationarity Support Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Variable Test Statistic (p-values) Full Sample Small Oil Large Oil MENA LAC SSA 
GDP pc (ln) 
Inverse chi-squared P 0.9856 0.7724 0.0862 0.3099 0.9212 0.999 
Inverse normal Z 0.9998 0.9694 0.9996 0.5046 0.983 1 
Inverse logit L* 0.9996 0.96 0.988 0.418 0.9803 1 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 0.9804 0.7789 0.0791 0.3363 0.9088 0.9959 
 Unit Root Support Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Δ GDP pc (ln) 
Inverse chi-squared P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Inverse normal Z 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Inverse logit L* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Stationarity Support Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Variable Test Statistic (p-values) Full Sample Small Oil Large Oil MENA LAC SSA 
trade 
Inverse chi-squared P 0.676 0.9556 0.1646 0.0001 0.0135 0.1603 
Inverse normal Z 1 0.9996 0.4983 0.7296 0.0244 0.3298 
Inverse logit L* 1 0.9995 0.3229 0.1497 0.0096 0.246 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 0.6851 0.9436 0.1668 0 0.0066 0.1616 
 Unit Root Support Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Δ trade 
 
Inverse chi-squared P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Inverse normal Z 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Inverse logit L* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Stationarity Support Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Variable Test Statistic (p-values) Full Sample Small Oil Large Oil MENA LAC SSA 
Rule of law 
 
Inverse chi-squared P 1 0.001 0.9879 0.492 0.9633 0.1603 
Inverse normal Z 1 0.055 0.9995 0.6203 0.9968 0.3298 
Inverse logit L* 1 0.0171 0.9987 0.5766 0.9968 0.246 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 1 0.0002 0.9778 0.5274 0.9488 0.1616 
 Unit Root Support Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Δ Rule of law 
 
Inverse chi-squared P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Inverse normal Z 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Inverse logit L* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Stationarity Support Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Variable Test Statistic (p-values) Full Sample Small Oil Large Oil MENA LAC SSA 
Oil PC*Rule of 
law 
 
Inverse chi-squared P 1 0.9963 0.1873 0.1543 1 0.1603 
Inverse normal Z 1 0.999 0.2662 0.5579 0.9945 0.3298 
Inverse logit L* 1 0.9988 0.2105 0.5323 0.9915 0.246 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 1 0.9898 0.1922 0.1564 0.9999 0.1616 
 Unit Root Support Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Δ Oil PC* Rule 
of law 
 
Inverse chi-squared P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Inverse normal Z 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Inverse logit L* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Stationarity Support Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Variable Test Statistic (p-values) Full Sample Small Oil Large Oil MENA LAC SSA 
Oil gdp*Rule of 
law 
 
Inverse chi-squared P 0.9859 0.0214 0.7322 0.0049 0.9949 0.1603 
Inverse normal Z 0.0922 0.1078 0.8696 0.0057 0.4916 0.3298 
Inverse logit L* 0.0515 0.0687 0.9021 0.0039 0.4945 0.246 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 0.9806 0.0139 0.7429 0.001 0.9851 0.1616 
 Unit Root Support Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Δ Oil gdp* Rule 
of law 
 
Inverse chi-squared P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Inverse normal Z 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Inverse logit L* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Stationarity Support Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Null hypothesis test is the existence of unit roots. All tests include a linear trend. Pesaran’s CIPS statistics are averages of the student t-statistics.  
Source: Author calculations. 
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Table S.5.1 Panel Cointegration between Oil Abundance and the five democratic institution measures. Westerlund Panel Tests. (Model I) 
Country Group 
 
Full Sample Small Oil Large Oil MENA LAC SSA 
Dependent Variables Group tests P-value  Robust 
P-value 
P-value  Robust 
P-value 
P-value  Robust P-
value 
P-value  Robust 
P-value 
P-value  Robust 
P-value 
P-value  Robust P-
value 
Electoral Group Mean Test t (Gt) 1 0.200 1 1 0.58 0.1 0.974 0.7 0.996 0.8 0.941 0.3 
 Group Mean Test t Ga 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Panel Test t (Pt) 1 1 1 1 1 0.4 0.998 0.8 1 1 1 1 
 Panel Test t (Pa) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Cointegration Support No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Liberal Group Mean Test t (Gt) 1 0.900 0.998 0.600 0.993 0.400 1 0.700 0.999 0.900 0.989 0.500 
 Group Mean Test t Ga 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Panel Test t (Pt) 1 0.100 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Panel Test t (Pa) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Cointegration Support No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Participatory Group Mean Test t (Gt) 1 0.800 0.999 0.800 0.999 0.600 1 1 1 0.600 0.993 0.300 
 Group Mean Test t Ga 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Panel Test t (Pt) 1 1 1 1 1 0.900 1 1 1 1 1 0.900 
 Panel Test t (Pa) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Cointegration Support No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Deliberative Group Mean Test t (Gt) 1 1 0.959 0.7 0.97 0.4 0.952 0.5 0.997 1 0.999 0.6 
 Group Mean Test t Ga 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Panel Test t (Pt) 1 1 1 1 1 0.8 1 0.9 1 1 1 1 
 Panel Test t (Pa) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Cointegration Support No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Egalitarian Group Mean Test t (Gt) 1 0.800 1 0.800 1 0.800 1 0.900 0.954 0.500 0.998 0.400 
 Group Mean Test t Ga 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Panel Test t (Pt) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.800 1 1 1 1 
 Panel Test t (Pa) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Cointegration Support No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Notes: We allow for a constant and deterministic trend in the cointegration relationship. Results for null hypotheses (H0): No cointegration.  





Table S.5.2 Panel Cointegration between Oil dependence and the five democratic institution measures . Westerlund Panel Tests. (Model II) 
Country Group 
 
Full Sample Small Oil Large Oil MENA LAC SSA 
Dependent Variables 
Group tests P-value  Robust 
P-value 
P-value  Robust 
P-value 
P-value  Robust P-
value 
P-value  Robust 
P-value 
P-value  Robust 
P-value 
P-value  Robust P-
value 
Electoral Group Mean Test t (Gt) 0.999 0.100 0.924 0.300 0.951 0.300 1 0.900 0.704 0.100 0.945 0.100 
 Group Mean Test t Ga 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Panel Test t (Pt) 1 1 1 0.900 1 1 1 1 1 0.700 1 0.500 
 Panel Test t (Pa) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Cointegration Support No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Liberal Group Mean Test t (Gt) 0.975 0.200 0.111 0.000 0.611 0.990 0.300 0.261 0.100 0.975 0.200 0.975 
 Group Mean Test t Ga 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Panel Test t (Pt) 1 0.000 0.991 0.200 1 0.999 0.700 1 0.000 1 1 1 
 Panel Test t (Pa) 1 0.800 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Cointegration Support No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Participatory Group Mean Test t (Gt) 1 0.8 1 0.9 0.6 0.2 0.959 0.5 1 1 0.982 0.4 
 Group Mean Test t Ga 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Panel Test t (Pt) 1 1 1 1 1 0.8 1 0.9 1 1 1 1 
 Panel Test t (Pa) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Cointegration Support No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Deliberative Group Mean Test t (Gt) 1 1 0.959 0.7 0.97 0.4 0.952 0.5 0.997 1 0.999 0.6 
 Group Mean Test t Ga 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Panel Test t (Pt) 1 1 1 1 1 0.8 1 0.9 1 1 1 1 
 Panel Test t (Pa) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Cointegration Support No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Egalitarian Group Mean Test t (Gt) 1 1 1 1 0.946 0.3 0.997 0.6 0.999 0.8 1 0.8 
 Group Mean Test t Ga 1 0.7 1 0.1 1 1 1 0.1 1 1 1 1 
 Panel Test t (Pt) 1 0 1 0 1 0.7 1 0 1 1 1 0.9 
 Panel Test t (Pa) 1 0.1 1 0.1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
 Cointegration Support No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Notes: We allow for a constant and deterministic trend in the cointegration relationship. Results for null hypotheses (H0): No cointegration.  




Table S.5.3 Panel Cointegration between Oil Abundance and the five democratic institution measures. Westerlund Panel Tests. (Model III) 
Country Group 
 
Full Sample Small Oil Large Oil MENA LAC SSA 


















Electoral Group Mean Test t (Gt) 1 0.8 1 0.9 0.962 0.3 0.999 0.6 0.994 0.3 0.939 0.1 
 Group Mean Test t Ga 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Panel Test t (Pt) 1 1 1 1 1 0.8 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Panel Test t (Pa) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Cointegration Support No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Liberal Group Mean Test t (Gt) 0.892 0 0.397 0.1 0.684 0.2 0.966 0.6 0.683 0 0.869 0.1 
 Group Mean Test t Ga 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Panel Test t (Pt) 1 1 1 1 1 0.8 0.997 0.5 1 1 1 1 
 Panel Test t (Pa) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Cointegration Support No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Participatory Group Mean Test t (Gt) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.7 
 Group Mean Test t Ga 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Panel Test t (Pt) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.7 
 Panel Test t (Pa) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Cointegration Support No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Deliberative Group Mean Test t (Gt) 1 0.8 0.98 0.1 1 1 1 0.9 0.996 0.8 1 0.8 
 Group Mean Test t Ga 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Panel Test t (Pt) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.9 
 Panel Test t (Pa) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Cointegration Support No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Egalitarian Group Mean Test t (Gt) 1 1 1 0.8 1 1 1 1 1 0.8 1 0.7 
 Group Mean Test t Ga 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Panel Test t (Pt) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.8 1 1 1 1 
 Panel Test t (Pa) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Cointegration Support No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Notes: We allow for a constant and deterministic trend in the cointegration relationship. Results for null hypotheses (H0): No cointegration.  





Table S.5.4 Panel Cointegration between Oil dependence and the five democratic institution measures. Westerlund Panel Tests. (Model IV) 
Country Group 
 
Full Sample Small Oil Large Oil MENA LAC SSA 
Dependent Variables 
Group tests P-value  Robust 
P-value 
P-value  Robust 
P-value 
P-value  Robust 
P-value 
P-value  Robust 
P-value 
P-value  Robust 
P-value 
P-value  Robust 
P-value 
Electoral Group Mean Test t (Gt) 1 0.9 1 1 0.999 0.6 1 0.8 0.999 0.8 0.888 0 
 Group Mean Test t Ga 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Panel Test t (Pt) 1 1 1 0.8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Panel Test t (Pa) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Cointegration Support No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Liberal Group Mean Test t (Gt) 1 0.3 0.841 0.1 0.998 0.3 1 0.9 0.949 0.1 0.924 0.1 
 Group Mean Test t Ga 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Panel Test t (Pt) 1 1 1 0.8 1 0.9 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Panel Test t (Pa) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Cointegration Support No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Participatory Group Mean Test t (Gt) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.991 0.3 
 Group Mean Test t Ga 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Panel Test t (Pt) 1 1 1 1 1 0.8 1 1 1 1 1 0.8 
 Panel Test t (Pa) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Cointegration Support No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Deliberative Group Mean Test t (Gt) 1 1 0.987 0.5 1 1 0.999 0.9 1 0.8 1 0.6 
 Group Mean Test t Ga 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Panel Test t (Pt) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.8 
 Panel Test t (Pa) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Cointegration Support No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Egalitarian Group Mean Test t (Gt) 1 1 1 1 1 0.9 1 1 1 1 0.999 0.4 
 Group Mean Test t Ga 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Panel Test t (Pt) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.9 1 1 1 1 
 Panel Test t (Pa) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Cointegration Support No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Notes: We allow for a constant and deterministic trend in the cointegration relationship. Results for null hypotheses (H0): No cointegration.  
Source: Authors’ estimate 
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Table S.6.1 Panel VAR’s Lag order selection: Oil Abundance and five democratic institution measures (Model I) 
 Δ Electoral  Dem Δ Liberal  Dem Δ Deliberative Dem Δ Participatory  Dem Δ Egalitarian Dem 
Lag BIC MAIC MQIC MBIC MAIC MQIC MBIC MAIC MQIC MBIC MAIC MQIC MBIC MAIC MQIC 
Panel A. full sample (96 countries) 
(1) -535.2  -53.0 -222  -540  -57.8  -227  -526  -44.1 -213  -561  -78.8  -248.6  -529.7  -47.4 -217  
(2) -378 -56.5 -169.7 -366.9 -45.4 -158.5 -370.7 -49.2  -162.4 -392.0 -70.5 -183.7 -377.4 -55.9  -169.1 
(3) -197.7 -36.9 -93.5 -190.6 -29.9 -86.5 -194.6 -33.9 -90.5 -200.1 -39.4 -95.9 -198.9 -38.1 -94.7 
Optimal lag Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) 
Panel B. Small-scale Oil Endowment (30 countries) 
(1) -466.3  -65.5  -214.6  -469.5  -68.7  -217.8  -454.5  -53.7  -202.8  -476.8  -76.0  -225.1  -467.4  -66.5  -215.6  
(2) -321.6 -54.3 -153.7 -319.7 -52.5 -151.9 -310.8 -43.5 -142.9 -328.2 -60.9 -160.3 -320.8 -53.6 -153.0 
(3) -172.8 -39.2 -88.9 -172.9 -39.3 -89.0 -165.8 -32.2 -81.9 -177.3 -43.7 -93.4 -170.4 -36.8 -86.5 
Optimal lag Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) 
Panel C. Large-scale Oil Endowment (30 countries) 
(1) -459,8 -58,4 -207,7 -457,5 -56,0 -205,3 -463,7 -62,3 -211,5 -455,6 -54,2 -203,4 -460,3 -58,9 -208,2 
(2) -307,2 -39,6 -139,1 -302,9 -35,3 -134,8 -310,4 -42,7 -142,2 -306,6 -38,9 -138,4 -306,9 -39,3 -138,8 
(3) -163,3 -29,5 -79,3 -146,4 -12,6 -62,4 -167,7 -33,9 -83,6 -162,8 -29,0 -78,8 -172,0 -38,2 -88,0 
Optimal lag Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) 
Panel D. Latin America and Caribbean (22 countries) 
(1) -453,0 -67,3 -212,2 -459,3 -73,6 -218,5 -482,7 -97,0 -241,9 -451,5 -65,8 -210,7 -424,9 -85,6 -217,0 
(2) -322,0 -64,9 -161,5 -317,1 -60,0 -156,6 -331,6 -74,5 -171,1 -315,5 -58,3 -155,0 -287,0 -60,9 -148,4 
(3) -166,4 -37,9 -86,2 -164,7 -36,1 -84,4 -168,5 -40,0 -88,3 -162,8 -34,2 -82,5 -152,8 -39,7 -83,5 
Optimal lag Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) 
Panel E. Middle East and North Africa (14 countries) 
(1) -424,9 -85,6 -217,0 -427,3 -88,0 -219,3 -417,9 -78,6 -209,9 -430,8 -91,5 -222,8 -427,3 -88,0 -219,3 
(2) -287,0 -60,9 -148,4 -283,3 -57,2 -144,7 -282,9 -56,7 -144,3 -289,7 -63,5 -151,1 -285,2 -59,0 -146,5 
(3) -152,8 -39,7 -83,5 -144,1 -31,1 -74,8 -147,1 -34,0 -77,7 -147,3 -34,2 -78,0 -142,5 -29,4 -73,1 
Optimal lag Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) 
Panel F.  Sub-Saharan Africa (38 countries) 
(1) -451,3 -48,6 -198,2 -444,7 -42,0 -191,6 -454,3 -51,6 -201,2 -448,9 -46,2 -195,8 -454,6 -51,9 -201,5 
(2) -308,5 -40,0 -139,7 -296,7 -28,3 -128,0 -309,1 -40,7 -140,4 -314,4 -45,9 -145,6 -313,2 -44,7 -144,4 
(3) -150,4 -16,2 -66,0 -161,6 -27,4 -77,2 -160,5 -26,2 -76,1 -165,1 -30,8 -80,7 -152,1 -17,9 -67,8 
Optimal lag Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) 
Note. MBIC = modified Bayesian criteria; MAIC = modified Akaike information criteria; MQIC = modified Hannan–Quinn information criteria. The optimal Lag order selection 
based on the smallest likelihood criteria of MBIC, MAIC and MQIC values. Source: Authors’ estimates.  
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Table S.6.2 Panel VAR’s Lag order selection: Oil Dependence and five democratic institution measures (Model II) 
 Δ Electoral  Dem Δ Liberal  Dem Δ Deliberative Dem Δ Participatory  Dem Δ Egalitarian Dem 
Lag BIC MAIC MQIC MBIC MAIC MQIC MBIC MAIC MQIC MBIC MAIC MQIC MBIC MAIC MQIC 
Panel A. full sample (96 countries) 
(1) -564,2 -83,0 -252,5 -566,3 -85,1 -254,6 -554,9 -73,7 -243,2 -577,0 -95,8 -265,4 -553,7 -72,5 -242,0 
(2) -383,5 -62,7 -175,7 -381,5 -60,7 -173,7 -384,3 -63,5 -176,5 -389,9 -69,1 -182,1 -381,7 -60,9 -173,9 
(3) -199,8 -39,4 -95,9 -195,8 -35,4 -91,9 -195,0 -34,6 -91,1 -202,2 -41,8 -98,3 -192,1 -31,7 -88,2 
Optimal lag Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) 
Panel B. Small-scale Oil Endowment (30 countries) 
(1) -471,8 -72,2 -221,0 -466,2 -66,6 -215,4 -463,1 -63,5 -212,3 -479,4 -79,8 -228,6 -463,7 -64,1 -212,9 
(2) -326,0 -59,6 -158,8 -310,2 -43,9 -143,0 -313,3 -47,0 -146,1 -323,1 -56,7 -155,9 -324,0 -57,6 -156,8 
(3) -171,9 -38,8 -88,3 -167,5 -34,3 -83,9 -162,0 -28,8 -78,4 -172,1 -38,9 -88,5 -171,6 -38,4 -88,0 
Optimal lag Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) 
Panel C. Large-scale Oil Endowment (30 countries) 
(1) -481,3 -81,6 -230,4 -487,3 -87,6 -236,4 -487,9 -88,2 -237,0 -483,9 -84,2 -233,0 -484,8 -85,1 -233,9 
(2) -324,8 -58,4 -157,6 -325,2 -58,7 -157,9 -332,0 -65,5 -164,7 -330,2 -63,8 -163,0 -328,2 -61,8 -161,0 
(3) -173,3 -40,0 -89,6 -169,1 -35,9 -85,5 -175,4 -42,2 -91,8 -172,0 -38,8 -88,4 -171,5 -38,3 -87,9 
Optimal lag Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) 
Panel D. Latin America and Caribbean (22 countries) 
(1) -463,4 -78,4 -223,1 -455,8 -70,8 -215,5 -464,1 -79,1 -223,8 -480,6 -95,6 -240,4 -455,8 -70,8 -215,5 
(2) -322,6 -65,9 -162,4 -316,1 -59,4 -155,9 -326,1 -69,5 -165,9 -332,8 -76,1 -172,6 -316,9 -60,3 -156,7 
(3) -163,5 -35,1 -83,4 -161,8 -33,4 -81,7 -166,0 -37,7 -85,9 -171,1 -42,8 -91,0 -157,9 -29,5 -77,8 
Optimal lag Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) 
Panel E. Middle East and North Africa (14 countries) 
(1) -431,4 -93,8 -224,6 -425,6 -88,0 -218,8 -429,8 -92,2 -223,0 -431,7 -94,1 -224,9 -441,8 -104,2 -235,0 
(2) -290,7 -65,6 -152,8 -293,2 -68,1 -155,3 -294,1 -69,0 -156,2 -297,3 -72,3 -159,5 -298,6 -73,5 -160,7 
(3) -148,4 -35,9 -79,5 -147,8 -35,3 -78,9 -145,0 -32,5 -76,1 -147,8 -35,3 -78,9 -149,4 -36,9 -80,5 
Optimal lag Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) 
Panel F.  Sub-Saharan Africa (38 countries) 
(1) -441,1 -38,8 -188,3 -446,9 -44,6 -194,1 -443,4 -41,1 -190,6 -450,9 -48,6 -198,1 -451,5 -49,2 -198,7 
(2) -318,6 -50,5 -150,1 -305,3 -37,1 -136,7 -315,5 -47,3 -146,9 -319,5 -51,3 -151,0 -326,3 -58,1 -157,8 
(3) -161,3 -27,2 -77,0 -156,0 -22,0 -71,8 -163,8 -29,7 -79,5 -165,8 -31,8 -81,6 -165,0 -30,9 -80,7 
Optimal lag Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) 
Note. MBIC = modified Bayesian criteria; MAIC = modified Akaike information criteria; MQIC = modified Hannan–Quinn information criteria. The optimal Lag order 




Table S.6.3 Panel VAR’s Lag order selection: Oil Abundance, Interaction term and five democratic institution measures (Model III) 
 Δ Electoral  Dem Δ Liberal  Dem Δ Deliberative Dem Δ Participatory  Dem Δ Egalitarian Dem 
Lag BIC MAIC MQIC MBIC MAIC MQIC MBIC MAIC MQIC MBIC MAIC MQIC MBIC MAIC MQIC 
Panel A. full sample (96 countries) 
(1) -780,6 -86,2 -330,6 -797,4 -103,0 -347,5 -785,8 -91,4 -335,9 -794,1 -99,7 -344,1 -777,4 -83,0 -327,4 
(2) -541,5 -78,6 -241,6 -547,9 -84,9 -247,9 -540,0 -77,1 -240,0 -550,9 -88,0 -251,0 -537,4 -74,4 -237,4 
(3) -280,4 -48,9 -130,4 -278,3 -46,8 -128,3 -276,5 -45,1 -126,5 -279,3 -47,8 -129,3 -279,9 -48,4 -129,9 
Optimal lag Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) 
Panel B. Small-scale Oil Endowment (30 countries) 
(1) -697,8 -120,6 -335,3 -679,2 -102,0 -316,7 -670,9 -93,7 -308,4 -692,7 -115,5 -330,2 -698,1 -120,8 -335,5 
(2) -474,5 -89,7 -232,8 -470,5 -85,7 -228,9 -460,9 -76,1 -219,2 -481,5 -96,7 -239,8 -471,5 -86,7 -229,8 
(3) -250,0 -57,6 -129,2 -243,3 -50,8 -122,4 -239,3 -46,9 -118,5 -247,2 -54,8 -126,4 -244,7 -52,3 -123,9 
Optimal lag Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) 
Panel C. Large-scale Oil Endowment (30 countries) 
(1) -674,3 -96,3 -311,2 -674,5 -96,4 -311,3 -685,1 -107,1 -322,0 -667,8 -89,8 -304,7 -668,1 -90,0 -304,9 
(2) -456,0 -70,6 -213,9 -448,7 -63,3 -206,6 -461,1 -75,7 -219,0 -446,9 -61,5 -204,8 -453,7 -68,3 -211,6 
(3) -238,8 -46,1 -117,8 -231,9 -39,2 -110,9 -242,9 -50,2 -121,8 -232,7 -40,1 -111,7 -237,1 -44,5 -116,1 
Optimal lag Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) 
Panel D. Latin America and Caribbean (22 countries) 
(1) -655,5 -100,1 -308,8 -656,2 -100,8 -309,5 -662,2 -106,7 -315,4 -667,5 -112,0 -320,7 -648,6 -93,1 -301,8 
(2) -462,7 -92,4 -231,5 -454,2 -83,9 -223,0 -463,5 -93,2 -232,3 -463,4 -93,1 -232,3 -454,8 -84,6 -223,7 
(3) -242,5 -57,3 -126,9 -234,0 -48,9 -118,4 -239,4 -54,2 -123,8 -237,5 -52,3 -121,9 -234,3 -49,2 -118,7 
Optimal lag Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) 
Panel E. Middle East and North Africa (14 countries) 
(1) -600,2 -111,7 -300,8 -610,5 -122,0 -311,1 -606,0 -117,4 -306,5 -610,5 -122,0 -311,1 -612,4 -123,8 -312,9 
(2) -411,2 -85,5 -211,6 -405,0 -79,3 -205,3 -411,4 -85,8 -211,8 -410,6 -84,9 -211,0 -412,3 -86,6 -212,7 
(3) -210,9 -48,0 -111,1 -212,1 -49,2 -112,2 -212,4 -49,6 -112,6 -214,0 -51,1 -114,2 -210,9 -48,1 -111,1 
Optimal lag Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) 
Panel F.  Sub-Saharan Africa (38 countries) 
(1) -673,3 -93,4 -308,8 -672,3 -92,4 -307,8 -682,1 -102,1 -317,6 -683,4 -103,4 -318,9 -680,5 -100,6 -316,0 
(2) -465,3 -78,6 -222,3 -454,1 -67,5 -211,1 -455,6 -69,0 -212,6 -461,3 -74,7 -218,3 -461,0 -74,4 -218,1 
(3) -235,5 -42,2 -114,0 -229,4 -36,1 -107,9 -237,5 -44,2 -116,0 -234,8 -41,5 -113,3 -228,5 -35,2 -107,0 
Optimal lag Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) 
Note. MBIC = modified Bayesian criteria; MAIC = modified Akaike information criteria; MQIC = modified Hannan–Quinn information criteria. The optimal Lag order 




Table S.6.4 Panel VAR’s Lag order selection: Oil Abundance, Interaction term and five democratic institution measures (Model IV) 
 Δ Electoral  Dem Δ Liberal  Dem Δ Deliberative Dem Δ Participatory  Dem Δ Egalitarian Dem 
Lag BIC MAIC MQIC MBIC MAIC MQIC MBIC MAIC MQIC MBIC MAIC MQIC MBIC MAIC MQIC 
Panel A. full sample (96 countries) 
(1) -819,3 -126,4 -370,5 -824,7 -131,8 -375,9 -739,1 -43,8 -288,5 -836,3 -143,4 -387,5 -805,4 -112,5 -356,6 
(2) -557,9 -95,9 -258,7 -558,5 -96,5 -259,2 -506,9 -43,4 -206,5 -562,8 -100,8 -263,6 -559,5 -97,5 -260,3 
(3) -285,6 -54,7 -136,0 -283,5 -52,5 -133,9 -259,9 -28,1 -109,7 -285,2 -54,2 -135,6 -280,4 -49,4 -130,8 
Optimal lag Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) 
Panel B. Small-scale Oil Endowment (30 countries) 
(1) -665,1 -87,2 -302,1 -872,1 -105,0 -390,6 -853,1 -86,0 -371,6 -884,6 -117,5 -403,0 -876,5 -109,4 -395,0 
(2) -459,0 -73,8 -217,0 -645,9 -70,6 -284,8 -651,7 -76,4 -290,6 -677,3 -102,0 -316,2 -666,6 -91,3 -305,4 
(3) -232,0 -39,4 -111,0 -461,0 -77,4 -220,2 -450,7 -67,2 -209,9 -456,5 -72,9 -215,7 -453,8 -70,3 -213,1 
Optimal lag Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) 
Panel C. Large-scale Oil Endowment (30 countries) 
(1) -897,3 -129,9 -415,5 -710,2 -134,7 -348,9 -899,3 -131,9 -417,6 -874,3 -106,9 -392,6 -891,9 -124,5 -410,1 
(2) -664,0 -88,5 -302,7 -472,3 -88,7 -231,5 -678,1 -102,6 -316,8 -651,6 -76,1 -290,3 -667,9 -92,3 -306,6 
(3) -445,6 -61,9 -204,8 -244,5 -52,6 -124,0 -460,1 -76,4 -219,3 -449,3 -65,6 -208,4 -452,7 -69,0 -211,8 
Optimal lag Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) 
Panel D. Latin America and Caribbean (22 countries) 
(1) -877,3 -138,1 -415,9 -853,2 -114,0 -391,9 -862,8 -123,6 -401,4 -881,2 -142,0 -419,8 -859,1 -119,9 -397,7 
(2) -673,8 -119,4 -327,8 -648,5 -94,1 -302,5 -659,4 -105,0 -313,4 -663,2 -108,8 -317,2 -651,0 -96,6 -304,9 
(3) -445,4 -75,8 -214,8 -440,2 -70,6 -209,5 -440,4 -70,8 -209,7 -443,5 -73,9 -212,8 -428,8 -59,2 -198,2 
Optimal lag Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) 
Panel E. Middle East and North Africa (14 countries) 
(1) -788,3 -140,1 -391,2 -780,5 -132,3 -383,5 -784,9 -136,7 -387,8 -791,3 -143,1 -394,2 -797,4 -149,2 -400,4 
(2) -580,8 -94,6 -283,0 -600,0 -113,9 -302,2 -600,4 -114,3 -302,6 -599,7 -113,5 -301,9 -594,6 -108,5 -296,8 
(3) -396,2 -72,1 -197,7 -403,2 -79,1 -204,7 -400,1 -76,0 -201,5 -404,7 -80,6 -206,2 -398,1 -74,0 -199,6 
Optimal lag Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) 
Panel F.  Sub-Saharan Africa (38 countries) 
(1) -859,7 -87,3 -374,3 -860,8 -88,4 -375,4 -862,1 -89,7 -376,7 -852,5 -80,1 -367,1 -851,0 -78,6 -365,6 
(2) -657,0 -77,7 -293,0 -657,9 -78,6 -293,9 -658,0 -78,7 -293,9 -660,6 -81,3 -296,6 -649,7 -70,4 -285,7 
(3) -433,8 -47,6 -191,1 -430,8 -44,6 -188,1 -430,8 -44,6 -188,1 -447,5 -61,3 -204,8 -439,9 -53,7 -197,2 
Optimal lag Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) Lag (1) 
Note. MBIC = modified Bayesian criteria; MAIC = modified Akaike information criteria; MQIC = modified Hannan–Quinn information criteria. The optimal Lag order 
selection based on the smallest likelihood criteria of MBIC, MAIC and MQIC values. Source: Authors’ estimates. 
 
